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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews both theoretical and empirical studies of
technological change in developing countries. It assesses the contribution
that these studies have made to technology strategy and offers suggestions for
further economic research.
Our review of theoretical studies by economists concludes that most such
studies have offered little policy insight. This is largely because of
limited empirical verification. The older economic growth theories (of the
1950s and 1960s) did not treat technology as an economic activity. More
recent "endogenous" growth theories, however, can be credited with reviving
interest in technology and technology policy. Some empirical testing and
verification of these models is now underway and with more empirical studies
this line of research could be quite valuable. Search models and induced
innovation models have made contributions to the extent that they have
influenced empirical work. Most recent game-theoretic studies have yet to
demonstrate policy relevance because of limited empirical verification.
The field of the economics of technology is thus primarily an empirical
field. A great deal of the relevant empirical work in the field has been
guided by the growth accounting framework developed in the 1950s. Total
factor productivity calculations have served as the basis for statistical
studies relating productivity to variables measuring inventive activity,
infrastructure and policy environments. The agricultural sector has been
extensively studied in this context and a large number of estimates of returns
to investment in agricultural R&D have now been reported. These studies show
that such investments have had a high payoff in both developed and developing
countries. They also show that agricultural technology is subject to high
levels of technological distance (i.e., location-speci ficity) and that the
degree of simple transfer (spillover) of technology from developed to
developing countries has been very low.
Empirical evidence for industrial technology in developing countries is
much less complete. Rates of return studies for private sector R&D in
developed countries show that privately captured returns are comparable to
returns on other relatively risky investments but that "social" returns are
much higher (roughly comparable to the high social returns for agricultural
research). The few studies available for developing countries suggest that
this is so for these countries as well.
The paper concludes that developing countries cannot expect to achieve
technology- driven economic growth without significant investment in
technology infrastructure and without developing a conducive environment for
such investment and for accessing foreign origin technology. Of the
approximately 100 less developed countries, only 25 or so have made sufficient
investments in technology infrastructure to achieve rapid economic growth.
And of these only ten or so have actually realized such growth because of
adverse policy environments.
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1.

Introduction
Except with respect to agriculture, investments in technological

change by less developed countries (LDCs) have not been emphasized in economic
thought about the general design of development policy.

Development textbooks

do devote considerable attention to technological topics in nonagricultura l
sectors, such as the choice of techniques and technology transfer through
direct foreign investment.

And international institutions do engage in

technological projects beyond the agricultural sector; supporting activities
in the industrial sector to disseminate technical information and to upgrade
production, for instance.

But neither the topics nor the projects are

generally perceived in relation to technological investments.

Typically they

are seen from other perspectives -- choice of techniques, in terms of
generating appropriately remunerative employment; technology upgrading, in
terms of assistance to structural adjustment following market opening; and so
on.

They are seldom brought together in a unified discussion of technology

and development or in some nodal point within bureaucratic structures.
Why are the technological aspects of development usually considered as
disparate elements?

We suspect that part of the answer lies in the absence of

a common conception of the role and nature of technological change in the
context of economic development.

Thus, in attempting to provide a more

unified treatment, we find it necessary to devote some space at the outset to
conceptual matters.
1.1.

Concepts of Technological Change
In the past, many development economists have approached technological

change from the vantage of structural change and technique choice.
"Technological change" has meant the first appearance in local production of
any novel process or product.

It has been considered the result of an
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endogenou s process; the demand for new technique s is induced by other changes
within the economy.

And it was often thought that the supply of technique s

was readily available from the "shelf" of technique s produced in developed
countries .

Perhaps most common has been the conceptio n of dynamic comparati ve

advantage , grounded in the tradition of Heckscher - Ohlin - Samuelson trade
theory [Chenery (1967)).

New products are introduce d into local productio n as

the structure of productio n evolves in response to changes in the compositi on
of domestic demand as well as in the balance of factor supplies and demands.
And new processes are adopted as the allocatio n of resources adjusts to
changes in relative factor prices.

But, apart from the costs of searching for

and acquiring new technical informati on, investmen ts in technolog ical change
have had no meaningfu l role in this view.
The policy implicati ons of this approach are straightfo rward.
Technolo gically, it is sufficien t if the policy regime simply insures the
timely initial adoption of economic ally warranted technique s and their
appropria te diffusion through the economy.

According ly, the requisite

policies are those required to achieve an efficient allocatio n of resources in
the context of exogenous ly determine d technolog ical alternati ves.

Among these

policies, the only ones explicitl y focused on technolog y per se are those that
address inefficie ncies that may result where technique s are not freely
available .

One such commonly employed technolog y policy, justified as

providing a public good, is governmen t sponsorsh ip of institute s that collect,
process, and dissemina te technical informati on.

But technolog y policies per

se are of secondary importanc e relative to the other kinds of policies that

are conventio nally associate d with achieving efficient resource allocatio n in
a static setting.
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Two assumptions taken together would justify this inattention to
endogenous elements on the supply side of technological change in the
development process.

One is an assumption that technology consists simply of

a set of discrete techniques, each wholly described by its "blueprint."

The

other is that all techniques are created in the developed countries, from
whence they flow to the technologically backward LDCs.

On these assumptions,

there is no place in development for investments in creating technology, in
the form of either assimilating imported techniques or developing new
techniques through adaptive invention.
assimilation is costless.

The first assumption implies that

The second implies that there is little scope for

LDCs to make useful adaptive modifications in technology.
If technology is perceived in more complex terms, consistent with
empirical evidence, one is led to conclusions quite different from those based
on the assumptions noted abo·~e.

Most obvious is the evidence, reviewed later

in this survey, that technology is in fact created in the LDCs.

This and

other important aspects of technological reality can only be fully
comprehended by recognizing that technology is, most fundamentally, knowledge
about how to do things.

Techniques, defined as singular ways of doing

particular things, are the result of choices made when applying technology in
specific circumstances with respect to economic, physical, and social
conditions.

In effect, a technique is a solution to a problem of constrained

maximization in which technology and circumstances form the constraints.
1.1.1.

Tacitness and Circumstantial Sensitivity
No existing technique is completely expressed by the sum of the

reproducible elements in which it is partially contained; that is, in the
codified information about it and the material inputs that provide the
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physical means for its accomplishm ent.

This is because much of the knowledge

about how to perform elementary processes and about how to combine them in
efficient systems is tacit, not feasibly embodied and neither codifiable nor
readily transferabl e.

Thus, though two producers in the same circumstanc es

may use identical material inputs in conjunction with equal information , they
may nonetheless employ what are really two distinct techniques owing to
differences in understandi ng of the tacit elements.

In turn, currently

existing techniques do not necessarily exhaust the potentially beneficial
application s of technology.

Even supposing that they represent optimal

solutions for the circumstanc es in which they are respectivel y used, it does
not follow that they must necessarily be optimal with respect to different
circumstanc es where they have not been previously tested.
Tacitness and circumstant ial sensitivity in the application of
technology are often disregarded , being obscured by the tendency to think
about techniques and circumstanc es in terms that are general rather than
specific.

Techniques are customarily identified in generic terms, typically

with reference to key physical inputs -- variety of seed, for example.

But

technologie s in use that are based on the same seed variety differ a great
deal; planting and harvesting dates differ among locations, as do the optimal
amounts of water and fertilizer used.

In industry, machines can be calibrated

to operate in different ways and can be used with distinct kinds of ancillary
fixtures to achieve various effects.

Circumstanc es are ordinarily identified

with economic variables, which are frequently summarized very simply in terms
of the wage-rental ratio, neglecting not only other economic variables but
also physical and social conditions.

Nontradeabl e inputs -- land, labor,

utilities, and services -- vary greatly in characteris tics and quality.

5

Similarly, ostensibly identical material inputs -- natural resources in
particular -- are characterized by widely differing precise specifications.
Among social institutions, labor-management relations are particularly
variable.

1.1.2.

Investments in Technological Change
Once technology is understood in these more complex terms, it is quite

obvious that investments in technology are made whenever it is newly applied,
regardless of the novelty of the application.

Learning about technology and

problem solving using the knowledge acquired in mastering technology are not
costless, even if the choices made in realizing the technique to be used are
identical in generic terms to choices previously made elsewhere.

The

magnitude of the warranted investment depends crucially on the circumstantial
sensitivity of existing reproducible elements of technology.

As will be

discussed in detail later, there are pronounced Hectoral differences in the

circumstantial sensitivity of generic techniques and, correspondingly, in the
scale of problem solving investments across sectors.
A stream of investments over time is typically required to overcome
tacitness and thus achieve mastery.

Not only is much technology tacit, so too

is much knowledge about the specifics of local circumstances and about the
ways that differences in circumstances affect the productivity of particular

techniques.

Tacit knowledge can only be acquired through investments in

learning -- learning that is importantly grounded in purposeful analysis of
information gained through practical experience.

With learning comes

increased understanding of technology and of circumstances, which typically
results in changes away from the original solution, as techniques are adapted
to local circumstances or otherwise modified to achieve higher productivity.
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Learning is generally a sequential process, so that alterations in techniques
usually take place through a progression of problem reformulations leading to
new solutions.
Investments in learning lead either to assimilation, duplicating
understanding that exists elsewhere without adding to the stock of
reproducible technology, or to invention and innovation, adaptive or
otherwise, creating novel elements of reproducible technology that yield
higher productivity under local conditions. 1

To determine the relative

frequencies of these outcomes in the experience of even one LDC would be an
enormous undertaking because of the level of firm-level detail that would be
required.

Patent statistics and similar indicators, supplemented by case

study research, clearly indicate that invention does occur in most LDCs, and
that the advanced LDCs may be about on a par with developed countries in this
regard.

Moreover, case study research strongly suggests tliat internationally

competitive levels of productivity are seldom if ever achieved through simple
assimilation.

It also suggests that the conventional measures fail to capture

a great deal of the technological effort that underlies the attainment of
competitive productivity levels.
Simple models of learning-by-doing [e.g. Arrow (1962b)] do not capture
the essential elements of technological development even at the level of an
individual firm that is pioneering the local introduction of some new
technology [Bell (1984)).

They are not at all suited to comprehending the

complexities of technological development among many interacting entities
forming an economy.

The essential elements are those that have been stressed

by economic historians [Landes (1969), David (1975), Rosenberg (1976, 1982),
among others] in writing about technological development in the now advanced
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countries.

Technological efforts to overcome tacitness and to adapt

technology to local circumstances have figured importantly whenever
technological followers have succeeded in effectively utilizing leaders'
technology.

From them have come many of the fundamental institutional and

organizational innovations that have helped to make technological change an
integral part of economic activity in the advanced countries.
The investment required to accomplish a particular technological
change depends critically on two things:

1) the degree of external

participation in its accomplishment; and 2) the internal technological
capability (ability to make effective use of technology) ,that has been
acquired through previous investments in technology.

By substituting for

internal technological capability through providing various technological
services, external agents can substitute for current investment. 2
Accordingly, the management of technological change involves choices of both
the changes to be made and the investments to be undertaken.

The latter are

essentially "make-buy" choices in which the decision to make results in the
creation of technological capital.

These choices raise important policy

issues with regard to the sequencing of an LDC's investments in technological
capital and to their phasing relative to other processes of economic
development.
1.2.

The Catchup Concept
The concept of catchup economic growth has been in the development

literature for many years [Landes (1990)].

From Gerschenkron's (1962)

discussion of the advantages of backwardness to the contemporary literature
dealing with convergence [Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)], the proposition
that technological followers benefit from the technology created by

0
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technological leaders has been accepted as an empirical truth.

A strong

version of this proposition is that the scope for catchup growth is
proportional to the difference in technological capabilities between a
follower and the leaders.

This version predicts an inverse relationship

between technological capabilities at any point in time and subsequent
productivity (as well as economic) growth.
The mechanism generally specified as underlying this process can be
described as technology transfer.

Followers, with appropriate policies and

investments, are expected to learn about the leaders' technology, choose the
best techniques for particular purposes, and then implement them.

As

previously indicated, the policies required for transfer are usually not seen
to differ from those required for achieving economic efficiency.

The

investments entailed are usually thought to be investments in education,
physical capital, and general management capability.

In particular, R&D

(research and development) and related activities that are considered
essential to the maintenance of technological leadership are often not deemed
to be important for success by follower countries.
Studies of economic growth in the post-World War II era have shown
that general convergence of income or productivity levels has not occurred
[Easterlin (1981), Landes (1990), Barro (1991), Williamson (1991)].

True,

several former LDCs, now typically classified as newly industrialized
countries (NICs), have grown at very rapid rates and have, in fact, converged
on the leading industrialized countries.
the OECD countries.

And there has been convergence among

But most LDCs are not on a path of convergence toward the

industrial countries.
Few studies have attempted to document carefully the sources of

r
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initial divergence in levels of economic development.

"Uneven development"

studies [e.g. Hymer and Resnick (1970), Hymer (1972)] generally attribute it
to political factors; economic historians [e.g. Ayres (1944), Landes (1969),
Morris and Adelman (1989), Rosenberg et al (1992)], to a broader constellation
of institutional and social factors.

But it appears to be generally accepted

that adverse institutions and deficient policy regimes are responsible for the
failure by most LDCs to achieve catchup growth over the past four decades.
This survey will conclude in addition that specific investments in technology
over sustained periods are essential to the realization of technological
catchup by followers.

Institutions and policy regimes may explain why the

investments have not been made, or why the investments made have been
ineffective in many cases.
Nelson (1991)].

But the investments are essential [Dahlman and

No LDC has to date achieved rapid economic growth without

continued technological investment.
1.3

Readers Guide
This chapter addresses questions that are primarily microeconomic in

nature:

What are the relevant varieties of technological investments?

large are the associated net returns?
undertaken?

What factors motivate their being

Do private agents allocate adequate resources to the right kinds

of technological changes?
failures?

How

How can governments overcome likely market

What can be learned about probable government failures from the

record of the past?

Answers to these questions would provide the basis for

gauging whether past technological investment has been insufficient or
misdirected and, if so, for probing the causes and consequences.
As will be seen, answers are more nearly complete for agriculture than
for other sectors.

This reflects the disparity in the attention and funding
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given by public authorities to promote technological change in different
sectors.

In turn, this survey includes work on developed countries where

answers are at least partially available for them but not for LDCs.

This is

not done to imply that the issues and answers for both kinds of countries are
necessarily the same, but instead to provide a meaningfully comprehensive
overview of the topic at hand.

Several major themes that build on the tacitness and circumstantial
sensitivity of technology are critical to an understanding of processes of
technological change.

These themes come primarily from empirical -

econometric and case study -- investigations of LDC experience.

As will be

argued in section 2, where pertinent theoretical work is reviewed, relatively
few insights have been provided by theorists, most of whose work neglects key
features of empirical reality in the LDCs.

The themes are developed in

sections 3 through 5, which collectively summarize the useful analytical
structures that have been derived from empirical studies in the field.
The first theme is developed in sections 3 and 4:

rapid economic

growth that is importantly based on technological change can not be realized
without technological development in the sense of creating technological
infrastructure in the form of specialized institutions and capital stocks.
And there are wide differences in levels of technological development among
LDCs.

Sections 4 and 5 articulate a second theme:

technology flows from

countries that are technological leaders to those that are followers in two
distinct ways.

One is through the direct transfer of techniques which are

then typically adapted to local circumstances.

The other is through the

transfer of knowledge that is then used by the follower country to generate
new techniques.

A follower's technological capabilities are critical for both
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modes of transfer, but in different ways.
theme:

Section 5 also adds a related

differences in economic, physical, and social conditions coupled with

the sensitivity of technology to these differences creates "technological
distance" between any two locations.

Distances are large in many fields of

technology and critically affect the technological make-buy choices that
confront entities in LDCs.
The final major theme, present throughout the chapter, is that
effective technology transfer requires distinct activities and investments to
minimize the cost of implementing the new technology and to maximize its
productivity once in place.

The optimal package depends on the field of

technology as well as on the technological distance involved.

It further

depends on the behavior of technology suppliers and on the recipient's level
of technological development.

Policies affecting resource allocation and the

availability of supporting infrastructure play a major role in determining
whether the optimal package is actually chosen.
Sections 6 and 7 review the evidence from empirical studies of, first,
the factors affecting the accumulation of technological assets in LDCs and,
second, the returns to investments in such assets, including the growth and
distributional implications of technological change.
with in section 8.

Policy issues are dealt

It argues that the policy options faced by individual LDCs

are significantly conditioned by technological development levels and, that
for most countries, the building of technological capabilities should be a
central objective of overall development strategy.

Section 9 concludes the

survey with a brief discussion of research priorities.

Theoretical Contributions
Economic development has been the focus of a large part of economic
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growth theory.

Much research was done in the 1950s and 1960s in the context

of long-run equilibrium growth to model economies characterized by labor
surplus and other conditions thought relevant to LDCs [Lewis (1954), Fei and
Ranis (1964), Jorgenson (1966)].

This research produced a heightened

appreciation for the important role of technological change in sustaining the
development process and generated greater comprehension of the significance of
sectoral differences in rates of technological change.

But it contributed

practically nothing to understanding how technological change is generated and
maintained.

The models simply treated technological change as an exogenous

process, one occurring at a steady rate over time.
Techniques of development planning that evolved in symbiosis with
growth theory embodied simple views of the sources of technological change.
The most extreme view was that derived from socialist planning theory and
practice.

The capital goods sector, drawing on R&D performed in specialized

institutes, was thought to be the singular driving force of technological
change.

Inspired by Mahalanobis (1955), India was one of several countries

which put this view into practice through development planning in the 1950s
and 1960s.

As will be discussed in further detail below, the priority given

to indigenous technology creation in the socialist approach proved to be
highly counterproductive.

So did the disregard for product innovation, which

was thought merely to cater to frivolous tastes. 3
A less extreme view, held by many Western advocates of development
planning, saw technological change as being concentrated in the design and
implementation of investment projects.

It was thought to emanate from the

activities of engineers who were responsible for selecting the best available
techniques and plant designs as well as for seeing to their effective
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implementation.

As in the socialist approach, hardly any systematic attention

was given to assuring continual processes of technological change within
existing enterprises.

Nonetheless, formal planning models often incorporated

exogenous technological change parameters, yielding projections which
generally turned out to be unrealistic.

Regardless of its ideological

underpinnings, the planning mentality of the 1950s and 1960s had a serious
consequence.

It stifled consideration of many forms of investment in

productivity enhancement.
In this section we review those few bodies of theoretical analysis
that do at least meaningfully incorporate some aspect of the processes of
technological change.

Included are the recently emerged body of endogenous

growth theory, models of invention and discovery, as well as older models of
induced innovation and technology diffusion.

Our own conclusion is that the

work in these areas has contributed useful insights to the analytical

structures that we will later bring to bear on the analysis of technological
change, but that most of our understanding of technological change comes from
empirical studies.
2.1

Endogenous Growth Models

Endogenous growth theory [e.g. Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988),
Murphy et al (1989), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992)] differs from its precursor in the explicit introduction of activities
which can affect the long-run growth rate.

Human capital formation and/or R&D

investment are modeled as being subject to increasing returns, with various
arguments being given about the source of the non-convexity, which is
generally found in some form of externality or spillover phenomenon. 4
presence of increasing returns (or, more accurately, a lower bound on

The
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diminishing returns to capital) is responsible for the possibility of per
capita income growth in the long run (asymptotically).

By exploring the

implications of the properties of technology as knowledge, the theory has
increased the general understanding of the importance of technological
investment. 5
To date, endogenous growth theory has achieved few robust policy
generalizations.

Moreover, development economists who grew up arguing about

the merits of Rosenstein-Rodan's (1943) "big push" and debating balanced
versus unbalanced growth are prone to find much that is not really new in
endogenous growth theory.

The vocabulary is new, but many of the insights

that are today considered novel were the staple of development economics in
the 1950s and 1960s.

Indeed, as is relatively well known, the basic insights

on which much endogenous growth theory is built are present in Adam Smith's
(1776) dis,:ussion of pin making technology.
Translation of the theory into empirically testable models is
confounded by using steady-state conditions as guides to specification.

While

these conditions do offer insight, it is not at all clear that they provide
directly applicable guides for empirical work.

Economies may require long

periods to reach steady-state, particularly if the incentives for appropriate
investments are not in place or are endogenously established.

Moreover,

technology spillovers are not well specified in these models, and
indivisibilities in processes of technology creation are not fully captured.
Most of the empirical work [e.g. Lichtenberg (1991), Kortum (1992),
Mankiw et al (1992)) so far spawned by the theory has produced some findings
of consequence for attempting to understand technological development.
Particularly noteworthy in this respect is Lichtenberg's (1991) work
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demonstrating the importance of distinguishing among different asset
accumulation processes; in particular, R&D versus schooling.

Also promising

is work like that done by Coe and Helpman (1993), which investigates the
relationship between total factor productivity (TFP) growth in OECD countries
and domestic as well as foreign R&D expenditures, with the latter being
included to capture international technology spillovers.

Additional research

of this kind is discussed in sections 5 through 7.
Endogenous growth theory has made a significant contribution through
the disciplined rigor that it has introduced into the analysis of the
technological underpinnings of long-run growth.

No less important, it has

brought issues of long-run growth back into mainstream discussion, making
development again a matter of interest to many economists.

Additionally, the

incorporation of endogenous growth considerations into international trade
theory has greatly increased its relevance in the context of technological
development.

(1991).

The most important work here is that of Grossman and Helpman

Their models treat inventive activity and related investments in a

systematic fashion to derive a number of new insights centered on the
distinctive roles of these investments in generating trade between
technological leaders and followers.

But the comments made above in relation

to endogenous growth theory generally apply here as well. Moreover, these
;
models do not fully come to grips with the disparities in technological
capabilities among countries at widely different levels of technological
development.
2.2.

Models of Invention

Growth theory is concerned with the implications of particular
properties of technological activity rather than with comprehending the
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activities per se.

Early work on invention did not consider international

dimensions but it did establish the basic rationale for intellectual property
rights {IPRs) and clarified their value.
effectiveness of existing IPR systems.

Machlup {1958) reviewed the
Arrow {1962a) and Nordhaus (1969)

developed the basic model for analyzing the incentives to engage in R&D that
are afforded by IPRs.

In later studies within the industrial organization

tradition, Barzel {1968), Dasgupta and Stiglitz {1980), Gilbert and Newbery
{1982) and Dasgupta {1986) developed models of patent races which demonstrated
the possibility of excessive duplication of R&D activity (due to overfishing
in the pool of latent inventions).
None of these studies paid attention to the peculiar circumstances of
LDCs, nor did they foster much work to verify their propositions empirically.
Even so, some theorists consider that this work has weakened what was once an
overwhelming case for IPRs.

In the realm of developed country policy,

however, there is a clear trend toward stronger IPR protection, both in case
law and in legislation.

This trend has an obvious international thrust, with

trade law increasingly being used to achieve IPR compliance by other
countries.

The just concluded GATT negotiations attest to the importance that

is attached to IPRs by the developed countries. 6

2.2.1.

Search Models
The invention process differs considerably across fields of technology.

In each field, the pre-invention sciences (see section 3.2) have devised
procedures for discovery and invention -- a kind of technology for the
discovery of technology.
this technology.

Scientific instruments, for example, are part of

Well developed experimental design structures are another.

Animal and plant improvement sciences rely on models of genetic improvement.
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Industrial engineering uses design principles grounded in both theory and
practical experience.

And so on.

Thus it is incorrect to say that the invention process is not amply
understood by the researchers working in most technological fields.

Models of

genetic selection, for example, can explain animal and plant improvement quite
well.

Nonetheless, each invention entails an "inventive step" that goes

beyond the known and conventional.

Trial and error, or search, along with an

element of boldness and risk-taking is involved.

Important pioneering, or

"macro" [Mokyr (1990)], inventions are characterized by large inventive steps.
They are typically followed by commonplace, or "run-of-the-mill" [Nordhaus
(1969)], inventions that come in a reasonably obvious (to those familiar with
invention in the field) sequence.

Lower down the scale are the frequent

minor, adaptive sub-inventions characterized by a low inventive step. 7

These

are the predominant inventions in LDCs, w.:lich rarely produce pioneering
inventions and, except for the more advanced among them, contribute relatively
few commonplace follow-on inventions.
Several authors have applied search concepts to examine the general
nature of the invention process [Schmookler (1966), Nordhaus (1969), Scherer
(1972), Evenson and Kislev (1975, 1976), Binswanger and Ruttan (1978), Lee
(1982)]. 8

The basic search model has two elements that are particularly

relevant to the invention of improved technology for LDCs. 9

It provides for

changes over time in the pool of knowledge from which inventions are drawn
(invention potential).

Such changes do not only flow from upstream, basic

research; they come as well from the search process itself and from similar
research activities elsewhere.

The model also provides for diminishing

returns within a period of research while allowing for diminishing, constant,
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or increasing returns over periods depending on changes in the pool of
potential inventions.
The search process is modeled as a sequence of experiments, each
composed of n trials or draws.

A single draw can be a new crop variety, a

certain dose of fertilizers, an alternative planting date, etcetera.

At the

beginning of a research period, a distribution of potential inventions exists.
This distribution is determined by factors which are importantly influenced by
the country's level of technological development within a particular field:
the design of the research project, the skills and inventiveness of the R&D
personnel, the results of research in previous periods, and the stock of
inventive "germplasm" available from science and from practical experience.
In the case of biological inventions, germplasm applies literally in the form
of biological parent material.

But the concept of parental material applies

to other fields of invention as well, since inventions tend co build on
inventions in what Rosenberg ((1976), ch. 6] has termed "compulsive
sequences"; in other words, inventions tend to be the progeny of prior
inventions, with important pioneering inventions being an exception.
The search model treats the uncertain outcome of a research project as
a random draw from the distribution of potential inventions.

Evenson and

Kislev (1975) employ the exponential density function in their model, which

yields the result that research within a single period is subject to
diminishing returns -- the expected value of the research objective changes in
proportion to the log of the number of trials. 10

The optimal extent of search

is given by the condition that the expected value of the marginal gross
benefit should be equal to the marginal cost of extending the search by one
trial.

Associated with the optimal search are an expected maximum value and,
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at the end of the period, a realized maximum value.
In the following period the research system faces a new set of
conditions.

If the preceding research was successful, the way to achieve a

better than previously realized outcome has been discovered.

But the last

period's research findings will generally also enable the researchers to
identify avenues of search that should no longer be considered promising,
leading to a rightward shift in the mean, though not necessarily in the all
important righthand tail, of the distribution of outcomes relative to the
previous distribution.

However, the entire distribution may be shifted to the

right by the introduction of new elements.

New skills, methods, and knowledge

may have been discovered by additional activities undertaken in the previous
period, including the monitoring of developments in science and in other R&D
programs in the same field.

New germplasm in the form of new materials or

potentially adaptable inventions from domestic or foreign sou:cces may ,:1.lso
have become available.
Thus in the following period the researchers face a greater challenge
insofar as they must improve on their previous success.
confront a changed distribution of potential discoveries.

But they also
Continued search is

optimal only if the new distribution offers sufficient additional inventive
potential relative to the result of the preceding period's research.

Absent

the introduction of new elements that go beyond the results of the formal
search process, there will quickly be insufficient additional potential to
justify continued search.

Thus the introduction of new elements leading to

sufficiently large rightward shifts in the distribution over time is the
necessary condition for sustained inventive search.

Without these elements,

there will be falling R&D activity and invention as the corresponding field of

20

technology becomes subject to exhaustion. 11
Within any given field, advanced countries are more dependent on
scientific progress to avoid exhaustion than are their technological
followers.

There are several reasons for this.

The germplasm available to a

follower is effectively increased or renewed as more is learned about its
peculiar circumstances.

In turn, a follower's technological development

within any field enables additional elements of technology to be effectively
transferred to serve as germplasm for new avenues of adaptive invention.
Moreover, individual followers can benefit from inventions and research
results emanating from other followers' technological efforts.

The search

model not only embraces these means of overcoming local exhaustion, it more
importantly highlights their critical importance, which is supported by ample
empirical evidence.
2.3.

Induced Innovation Models

Models of induced innovation are less concerned with the search
process per se than with the determinants of the direction of search; for
example, whether the search is for more labor-intensive or for more
capital-intensive techniques.

These models posit what is essentially a

transformation frontier -- or "invention cum innovation possibilities
frontier" (IPF) -- among factor augmenting and/or saving reductions in cost:
(1)

I(dL, d.K, E) = 0,

where dL (d.K) is labor (capital) augmenting or saving productivity or
technological change relative to the unit isoquant and Eis R&D expenditure.
Thus, for a given R&D budget, various combinations of dL and dK can be
achieved.

Relative factor prices determine the combination yielding the

largest cost reduction.

Binswanger [ch.s 4 and 5 in Binswanger and Ruttan
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(1978)] discusses the specification of an IPF based on search processes.

His

model overcomes the seriously objectionable characterization of invention as a
deterministic process that is found in other IPF models.
Applied to the advanced countries, to technological change at the
global frontier, induced innovation models suffer from a lack of evidence
about the character of the IPF.

In this context, the most complete evidence

supporting the induced innovation hypothesis, assembled in Binswanger and
Ruttan (1978), is drawn from agriculture.

Applied to LDCs, the hypothesis

that expected factor prices affect the direction of search activity has
greater plausibility insofar as there is less uncertainty about outcomes
behind the global frontier.

There is, in fact, a good deal of case study

research that is at least consistent with the hypothesis.

This research

generally supports the view that "getting factor prices right" is important
not only for choice of technique reasons but also in relation to incentives
affecting the nature of technological activity.

But there is an important

respect in which induced innovation models are fundamentally misleading,
particularly in the LDC context.

These models take the exploitation of

invention potential for granted.

However, cross-country evidence (discussed

in section 4.3) clearly indicates that the mere existence of potential
inventions is insufficient to motivate investments to realize them.

In most

countries, the fundamental problem concerns the absence of invention, not its
direction.

2.4.

Diffusion Models
Diffusion models focus on the spread of innovations across firms

engaged in similar activities.

They relate to the evaluation and adoption of

a well specified technology by individual producers operating in relatively
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homogeneous production conditions.

The classic statements of the diffusion

model are given by Griliches (1957) for agriculture and by Mansfield (1961)
for industry.
The general diffusion model assumes that the probability of a
particular firm's deciding to adopt an innovation at a particular point in
time depends on three things:

the proportion of the firms in the industry

that have already adopted the innovation; the benefits from adopting it; and
the costs of its adoption. 12

In the standard implementation of the model, the

derived functional form is a logistic equation:
(2)

where p(t) is the proportion of firms that have adopted the innovation by time
t, a is a constant, and bis an equation expressing the dependence of the
diffusion rate on the benefits and costs of adoption. 13

The model has

traditionally been applied to analyze the determinants of differences in
diffusion rates across distinct innovations or groups of firms.
Results from applying the diffusion model are generally interpreted to
signify that adoption decisions are economically motivated. 14

Inventions that

have higher costs and lower benefits diffuse more slowly; conversely, lower
costs and higher benefits lead to faster diffusion.
that skills related to adoption also matter.

Some studies have found

In agriculture, diffusion rates

are higher among educated farmers and are accelerated by extension
prpgram. 15

In industry, higher diffusion rates are found in industries that

spend proportionately more on R&D.

Market structure is also sometimes found

to exert a significant influence.
The basic insights of the diffusion model are supported by empirical
research in both developed and less developed economies.

But the standard

(
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empirical specification has not been successfully applied to the spread of
technology across widely differing conditions of production, either within or
between countries.

This is because it does not provide a straightforward

means to incorporate the circumstantial sensitivity of technology, which often

acts as a barrier to the simple diffusion of well specified techniques.

Other

approaches that embody the basic insights in a framework that directly
accommodates circumstantial differences have proven more fruitful.

Vernon's

(1966) model characterizing the international product cycle is the seminal
case in point for manufacturing activities.

Recent work, discussed at length

later in this survey, has used econometric methods to measure and incorporate
technological distance in models of technology transfer.
2.5.

Growth Accounting

The development of growth accounting methods and their application to
developed countries has had a profound effect on economists' thinking about
development.

Following the discovery [Solow (1957), among others] in the

1950s of the large "residual" in the growth of per capita output that could
not be attributed to the growth of per capita capital service flows,
economists embarked on two related lines of empirical research to comprehend
its basic nature.

Both lines of research have been relevant to understanding

technological development.
The first, starting with Griliches (1957, 1963) and Denison (1962),
sought to explain the residual by more carefully and properly measuring
inputs.

Capital, labor, and output measures were disaggregated into distinct

types to take account of changes in their quality.

Early work on labor

quality, adjusting for increases in schooling and changes in occupational
composition, "explained" a considerable part of the residual.

Denison, in
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particular, made further adjustments to account for changes in such things as
the composition of economic activity, market structures, and public
infrastructure.

Encouraged by the initial work, Jorgenson and Griliches

(1967) attempted a full explanation.

But the attempt was not generally

considered to be persuasive [see Denison (1969)].

In subsequent work,

Jorgenson and his colleagues [Jorgenson et al (1987)] have continued refining
the measurement of input quality and the estimation of substitution
parameters, leading to the identification of a residual "cleansed" of the
impact of quality changes. 16
The second line of research has used statistical methods derived from
hedonic regression approaches to identify sources of economic and TFP growth.
Many studies in this tradition first compute TFP measures and then examine
their statistical association with various forms of investment and different
policy variables.

In this work, Griliches and others have directly focused on

the variables that determine input and output qualities as well as contribute
to the cleansed residual, variables like R&D, schooling, infrastructure, and
the policy regime.

Much of their work has been concentrated on developing

measures of the determining variables, distinguishing between investments in
stocks and flows of services.

Section 7.1 of this chapter surveys research

within this vein to estimate returns to R&D and to investigate spillovers of
the results of research in one location to other locations.
3.

Technological Infrastructure
Developing countries have not realized rapid economic growth without

also having experienced significant technological development.

Technological

development involves both institutions and organizations which together
constitute a country's technological infrastructure.

The principal
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institutions take the form of IPRs and contract laws that provide incentives
to develop technology and facilitate its exchange among economic agents.

The

organizations are those where the scientific and technical competence of
significant numbers of people are combined to achieve the advantages of
specialization and exchange.

Such organizations may be private or public;

they may exist as separate bodies or as constituent elements of larger
entities.

In them resides a substantial share of any society's accumulated

stock of technological investment. 17
3.1.

Intellectual Property Rights
IPRs are generally considered to be elements of a social contract

rather than "natural" rights.

The United States and some European countries

have long experience with them, while international agreements (or
conventions) providing IPRs for foreigners have been respected in most
de·,eloped countries for more than a century.

Many LDCs possess operating IPR

systems and have subscribed to the international conventions.

But there is a

good deal of controversy about the effectiveness of IPRs and their role in
technological development.

In the 1970s IPRs became part of the North-South

debate over the terms of technology transfers.

LDCs saw IPRs as primarily

protecting advanced country interests and as being partially responsible for
what was perceived as "unfair," or at least inappropriate, pricing of
technology.

Most LDCs actually weakened their IPR systems during this period.

The debate shifted sharply in the 1980s as the North, led by the United
States, began to use trade law to push for stronger IPRs for technology
originating in the North.
Several major kinds of intellectual property are distinguished in laws
governing the rights to them. 18
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o

patents, for conventional inventions;
utility models, for minor or "petty" inventions;
plant breeders rights, for new plant varieties;
copyrights, for creative works (writing and music, for example);
trademarks, for identifying names or symbols;
trade secrets, for proprietary information; and,
industrial designs, for designs and shapes.

The laws of most relevance to technological development pertain to
patents, utility models, and plant breeders rights, all of which relate to
inventions broadly conceived.

However, copyrights have been used to protect

inventions in the form of computer software.

Trademarks and industrial

designs protect products, which may or may not embody new technology.

Trade

secrecy law provides a distinct form of protection because it does not require
the disclosure of proprietary information.

But not all privately held

information is eligible for such protection.
In these laws, the term "protection" essentially means "a limited
right to exc:Lude" others from making or using the designated property without
the permission of the holder of the right.

The right is limited to a fixed

term of years (17 to 20 years for patents, 4 to 7 years for utility models,
and so forth) and by its scope of coverage, discussed below.
right applies only in the country granting the right.

Moreover, the

However, international

agreements provide "national treatment" to foreigners from signatory
countries.

The major such agreements are the Paris Convention for patents and

the Berne Convention for copyrights.
The scope of protection is implicitly defined by the accepted standard
for obtaining the particular right. For patents these standards include:
o
o
o

novelty: the invention must be new in prescribed terms;
usefulness: it must useful and practical or operational in form;
inventive step: it must not be obvious to a person skilled in the
art.

The patent document must also provide an "enabling disclosure" that
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serves to reveal the true nature of the invention to the public.

Weaker

standards, designed to protect minor national inventions, are applied in the
case of utility models.

Novelty is sometimes judged against a national

standard -- the invention need only be new in the country in question.
Additionally, the inventive step may be lower than is required for a patent.
When properly administered, utility models provide protection for adaptive
inventions of a minor nature.

In this regard they are similar to industrial

designs.
Multicellular plants and animals have in the past been excluded from
the scope of patent protection because they are naturally occurring and, as
with concepts, are considered to be the common heritage of mankind [see, e.g.,
Persley (1990)].

Plant breeders rights were developed as an alternative to

patents to provide incentives to private plant breeding activities.

With the

emergence of hiotechno:Logy has come renewed controversy over the protection
that should be afforded to living organisms.

In the United States, patent

protection has for some time been provided to new plant varieties; more
recently, administrative decisions by the U.S. Patent and Trade Mark office
have extended patent protection to multicellular animals. 19
In granting property rights to inventors, societies give legal sanction
to monopolies that might otherwise be sustained through de facto (not de jure)
trade secrecy.

But this is done in exchange for public disclosure, which is

important in providing germplasm for subsequent inventions.

An offsetting

cost is associated with the monopoly power that is bestowed by IPRs, but this
cost has to be assessed as well in relation to the likelihood that inventive
activity is stimulated by the presence of IPR protection. 20

In principle, the

scope -- breadth and length -- of the monopoly right can be adjusted to
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maximize the expected net benefits provided by a country's IPR system. 21
The economic case for international agreements to recognize the rights
of foreigners by treating them on a par with nationals is clear for countries
at similar levels of technological development.

Such agreements broaden the

markets for inventions and strengthen the incentives to inventive activity in
the subscribing countries.

They also provide protection for direct foreign

investment and incentives to sell technology abroad.

The experience of recent

decades has shown that international conventions, which do not include
enforcement sanctions, work effectively among countries which both buy and
sell technology.

But they do not work well between industrialized countries

and others that are primarily buyers of technology, as are most LDCs.

This

point is elaborated in the concluding section on policy, in the context of a
more general discussion of the LDCs' failure to use IPRs to their
advantage. 22
3.2.

The Structure of Knowledge Generating Activities
Agricultural research and extension systems adhere to a common design

and afford the most transparent example of the structure of technological
activities.

For this reason, and because of agriculture's importance in the

economies of the poorest countries, the general design of these systems is
worthy of particular attention.
The agricultural sector is subject to three phenomena that
differentiate it from most other sectors:
o
o
o

The predominance of small family farm units in producing most
agricultural products in most countries;
The limited scope for intellectual property protection for biological
technology, particularly for plant varieties and animal types; and,
The high degree of sensitivity to the physical environment for much
·
agricultural technology. 23

These conditions have led the public sector to take on the principal
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responsibility for developing agricultural technology in most countries, even
in highly market-oriented economies.
They have additionally motivated a hierarchical structure of
specialized R&D organizations, with regionally focused experiment stations at
their base and various supporting laboratories at supra-regional levels. 24
This structure extends globally to a number of international agricultural
research centers which operate under the aegis of the Consultative Group for
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).

The hierarchical structure is

loosely paralleled by the boundaries that define the many interlinked fields
of specialized knowledge that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the
development of agricultural technology.

These boundaries are the result of

institutional evolution over many decades.
Figure 1 identifies the specialized fields of knowledge in a
hierarchical ordering that depicts the flo~s of knowledge among fields and the
relationships to various agricultural activities and branches.

It is based on

the present-day agricultural research system in the United States, one of the
world's most advanced.
innovations at level IV.

The primary objective of the system is to yield
These are the products of R&D taking place at level

III, which is conducted in both private firms and public sector programs.
Three vertically interrelated levels of R&D activity are present in
the figure.

Upstream from inventive activity at level III are the

pre-technology sciences (level II), which are differentiated in their
objectives and incentive structures from the general sciences (level I), but
which employ the same language and scientific methods.

The general sciences

(more often referred to as basic sciences) do science for scientists.

In

contrast, the pre-technology sciences do science for inventors; that is, they

Figure 1
Hierarchical Specialization in R&D Systems for Agriculture
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anticipate or perceive inventors' demands and respond accordingly, just as
inventors anticipate or perceive users' demands for their inventions.
Downstream from levels III and IV are extension activities (level V) which
support the implementation of new technology by the users of inventions.
Public agricultural extension programs serving farmers are an integral part of
the system of research, teaching, and extension among the American "land
grant" institutions.

Private firms supplying farm technology also invest in

extension to aid them in their testing and experimental activities as well as
to inform farmers about the use of their products.
Extension services are located spatially close to the users.

In the

United States, each county (jurisdiction below the state level) has an
extension program whose agents are supported by specialists working in
agricultural experiment stations (level III applied R&D units).

Typically, a

number of such stations are distributed geographically throughoit a state,
with a central unit at the apex, most often located at a state university
where it is closely integrated with teaching.

The federal government also

operates a number of separate, specialized experiment stations, some of which
have close ties to state universities.

Level II pre-technology sciences are

well developed only in the larger university systems (Cornell, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin, among others).

In the course of doing science for inventors, they

serve as the training ground for most agricultural scientists (especially
those who will be engaged in invention).
The structure of scientific and technological effort in agriculture is
rather unique insofar as it is organized around the public sector's large role
in invention and extension, though it does have a reasonably close counterpart
in medicine and public health in most countries.

But not all biological
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research for agriculture is public.

Private firms have long been active in

those areas where the biological technology provides inherent protection to
inventors, as it does for hybrid crops such as corn and sorghum. 25

With rice

becoming a hybrid crop in some regions, private firms have begun to undertake
rice research as well.

More generally, the private sector is growing in

importance as a supplier of technology to farmers in both developed countries
and more advanced LDCs.

In part this follows the strengthening of IPRs for

plant varieties (and, to some extent, animal breeds), which has led to an
expansion of plant breeding programs in the seed industry [Pray (1987)].
There are very few extensive systems of public sector invention for
the industrial sector; among LDCs, India has had the largest -- the network of
laboratories associated with India's Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research.

More generally, most LDCs invest very little in level III

activities regardless of sectoral orientation; they publicly inv,~st virtually
nothing in extension outside of agriculture.

In the developed countries,

except in agriculture, most level III efforts are carried out by private firms
with the encouragement of well developed incentive systems.

Private firms

also engage in extension through various consulting and engineering activities
as well as though services related to the sales of producer goods, but these
activities are seldom referred to in terms of extension.
3.2.1.

Empirical Evidence of Structural Linkages
Evidence for the hierarchical structuring of related scientific and

technological activity comes from studies of citations in journal articles as
well as in patents.

To examine article citations within and between fields,

Huffman and Evenson (1993) classified some 300 journals dealing with research
on animals, crops, forestry, nutrition, and agriculturally-related social
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science according to their levels.

For the first two of these areas, they

found that articles pertaining to the pre-invention sciences formed the link
between the general sciences and technology invention.

In relative terms, few

citations were found directly linking levels I and III, while many were found
in both directions between levels I and II as well as between levels II and
III.

Moreover, from examining the impact of agricultural research on American

farm productivity, they concluded that the pre-invention sciences yielded the
highest social returns per dollar spent on research. 26

Their findings are

consistent with the view that research at level II plays a vital role in some
technological fields through augmenting the pools of knowledge from which
level III inventions are drawn.

Further evidence of the importance of

knowledge upstream from level III comes from cross-country comparative
research by Evenson (1993c) that examined factors responsible for differences
among LDCs in the productivity of agricultural research.
Patent documents in many countries, including the United States, give
citations of relevant precursors, which often include scientific publications.
It does not necessarily follow in such cases that a scientific discovery was
the initiating factor behind the invention.

In fact, there is a good deal of

research to show that inventions are primarily motivated by demand factors
[Rosenberg (1974)].

Nonetheless, the citation of a scientific reference does

signify its importance as a facilitating factor.

Correspondingly, such

references can be used to identify differences among technological fields with
respect to their dependence on scientific knowledge as opposed to the results
of practical experimentation.
fields:

Evenson (1990) studied patent citations in six

dentistry, animal husbandry, general medicine, genetic engineering,

molecular biology, and plant agriculture (patents here largely pertain to
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chemical and mechanical technology).

Molecular biology exhibited the highest

linkage to science, with 70 percent of the sampled patents citing one or more
scientific publications.

Next were animal husbandry and genetic engineering,

with citation ratios of 61 and 50 percent respectively.

Inventions in plant

agriculture, general medicine, and dentistry had the least linkage to science,
having citation ratios of between 15 and 8 percent.

For most mechanical

invention, the linkages to science would be even less.
3.3.

lntersectoral Interdependencies

Just as there are multiple and variable linkages between scientific
areas and technological fields, so too there are technological
interdependencies among sectors of economic activity, such that no sector is
wholly self-sufficient in generating its own technology.

Inventions generated

in one industry may be used in the same industry or in other industries.
Typically, apart from those embodied in machinery, process inventions have the
same industry of manufacture (IOM) and sector of use (SOU). 27
product inventions, IOM and SOU differ.

But for most

Thus, distinct from a conventional

input-output matrix of product flows, there is an implicit technological
input-output matrix mapping invention flows from IOM to SOU.

This technology

matrix is critical to measuring and understanding the relationship between
R&D, inventions, and productivity change.
Evenson et al (1989) used information generated by the Canadian Patent
Office to develop an IOM-SOU concordance, which gives the frequency
distributions of IOMs and SOUs for each of more than six thousand (aggregated)
International Patent Classification (IPC) categories; that is, technological
fields.

Canada's Patent Office has assigned IPC categories along with IOM and

SOU categories (4-digit level) to all patents granted since 1972.

By 1990,
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more than two hundred thousand patents had been so assigned, yielding a large
sample from which to determine the concordance frequency distributions.

Since

most of the world's important inventions are patented in Canada (only 12
percent of the patents are to Canadian inventors), the concordance is a
plausible estimate of its global counterpart.
Using the concordance, any set of patents can be distributed into IOMs
and SOUs to obtain an estimate of the corresponding technology matrix. 28 ,
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Figure 2 demonstrates the basic nature of inter-industry technology flows.
Based on all patents registered in Canada between 1972 and 1990, for each
2-digit SIC industry, it shows the proportions of total inventions originating
in (vertically) other industries and utilized by (horizontally) other
industries respectively.

Industries above the diagonal are net users in

proportionate terms; those below, net suppliers.
figure show the sample means.

The dashed lines in the

Industries in the southwest quadrant with

respect to these lines are correspondingly self-sufficient in relative terms,
while those in the northeast quadrant exhibit relatively high interdependence.
Consider the drug industry as one example.

Most of the inventions used by it

originate in the chemicals sector; most of its inventions are used in the
health sector.
It is clear from Figure 2 that manufacturing industries are
substantially dependent on one another for technology.

Not obvious from the

figure is the fact that most non-manufacturing sectors -- including
agriculture, forestry, fishing, construction, communications, health, finance,
and trade -- depend on manufacturing for much, in some cases most, of their
technology.
4.
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Figure 2
Inter-industry Invention Flows
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Most technological development in LDCs in some way or another starts
with and builds on transfers -- of various kinds, including spillovers -- of
technology from technologically more advanced countries. 31

Indeed,

technological development can not be understood apart from various forms of
international trade that importantly involve technology.

Consider the two

extremes by which a particular sector can be established in an LDC.

One is

the virtually autarchic creation (or re-creation) of technology by locally
providing all of the necessary elements through developing the corresponding
technological capabilities.

This approach is likely to be very costly and

time consuming even if extensive use is made of readily available foreign
knowledge that spills over through documentary sources and imported
"protypes."

But it does guarantee the achievement of at least rudimentary

proficiency in the associated capabilities.

The opposite extreme is the

establishment and operation of an industry using only foreign capabilities
with no local technological development whatsoever.

This sometimes happens,

for example, with direct foreign investment in an enclave when indigenous
involvement is limited to the employment of unskilled labor.

It can be an

effective way of generating employment and foreign exchange, at least over the
short to medium term, but in the absence of appropriate policies it need not
contribute to the development of local capabilities.
As the foregoing extremes illustrate, trade possibilities involving
technology are such that there is no necessary relationship between the
sectoral composition of a country's economic activity and the extent of its
technological development sector-by-sector.

Individual sectors can be created

and developed through many alternative combinations of local and foreign
capabilities.

Thus various paths of technological development can be followed
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to reach the same level of economic development.

To comprehend technological

development in these terms, one needs an analytical framework that integrates
investment choices among technological assets with trade choices among
transactions involving elements of technology.

This section develops such a

framework and then examines differences in levels of technological development
among LDCs.
4.1.

Technological Assets
The critical technological assets are human and organizational capital,

the latter being the knowhow used to combine human skills and physical capital
into systems for producing and delivering want-satisfying products.
Corresponding to the wide variety of technological fields and elemental
activities through which knowledge is applied, there are a vast number of
differentiated technological capabilities.

They can be classified in various

ways, each of which corresponds to a different approach to distinguishing
among the aspects of technological knowledge and its practical application. 32
For analyzing technological development in general terms, it is most useful to
separate technological capabilities into three broad categories according to
whether they are related to production, investment, or invention:
o Production capabilities: pertain to the operation of productive
facilities; they encompass various activities involved in product
design, production management and engineering, repair cum maintenance,
input sourcing and output marketing, and so forth.
o Investment capabilities: relate to the expansion of existing capacity
and to the establishment of new production facilities; they embrace the
many activities related to project selection, design cum engineering,
and execution as well as extension services and manpower training.
o Invention capabilities: concern indigenous efforts to adapt,
improve, and develop technology.
The grounding of proficiency in experience limits the scope for
transferring capability gained in one activity to other activities.

The

highly differentiated nature of technological knowledge also establishes a
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strong association between capabilities and activities.

The boundaries

created by experience and knowledge differentiation are often fuzzy, but their
existence nonetheless means that specific investments are required to develop
distinct capabilities.

One shouldn't, however, think that all capabilities

are specific to particular sectors.

Some, like the ability to mix iron ores

to achieve the best blast furnace charge, are highly sector specific.

But

many, such as the basic knowhow involved in the adhesive properties of
different materials, are more generally applicable.

Others -- such as those

related to information and control systems or to aspects of project execution
find even more widespread application.
Investments in technological capabilities, whether to strengthen
existing ones or to add new ones, are often associated with changes that alter
patterns of specialization and exchange.

These changes occur through

investiaents embJdied in organizational structures, codified knowledge and
procedures, and less formalized customs that govern behavior within and among
entities.

They are fundamentally important because they are the means by

which transactional modes involving technology are changed.

Indeed,

technological change can occur solely as the result of such changes, as when
the creation of new modes of distributing products leads to lower transactions
costs.
The potential benefits of technological development can often not be
fully realized without changes in transactional forms.

The changes are

typically in the direction of increasing specialization on the basis of
technological capability, either through the creation of new units within
existing entities or the establishment of new entities.

For example:

In

manufacturing, young firms often carry out activities like quality control,
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project engineering, and R&D in a generalized production management cum
engineering department; but as the capabilities and their uses increase over
time, these activities are separated into specialized departments, which
sometimes then evolve into separate entities [see, for example, Katz (1987)].

4.2.

Trade and Technological Development
With specialization and exchange, technological capabilities are

deployed across entities through market transactions involving elements of
technology.

These transactions occur between countries as well as within them

and take many forms which involve -- singly or in combination -- goods,
services, and information.

In terms of broad categories, the transactional

elements of technology include:
o Information: about physical processes and social arrangements that
underlies and is given operational express in technology.
o R&D: activities of generating new knowledge or inventive germplasm
with the u}.timate objective of practical use.
o Technical services: activiti.es, such as engineering, of translating
technological knowledge into the detailed information required to
establish or operate a productive facility in a specific set of
circumstances.
o Embodiment activity: activities of forming physical capital in
accord with given and complete design specification.
o Training services: activities of imparting the skills and abilities
that are used in economic activity.
o Management services: activities of organizing and managing the
operation of productive facilities, the implementation of investment
projects, and the development of process and product innovations.
o Marketing services: activities of matching the capacity of
productive facilities to existing and latent market demands.
Trade involving elements of technology has many transactional modes that
serve numerous objectives. 33

Licensing, subcontracting, technical agreements,

management contracts, marketing arrangements, turnkey project contracts,
direct foreign investment, and trade in capital goods are only a few of
them. 34

Some of these modes provide complementary services without any real

flow of technology.

Marketing services provided under international
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subcontracting are an example, but they are often combined with technical
services which do provide technology.

Other modes bundle information together

with services required to translate it into useable form.

Direct foreign

investment, turnkey project contracts, and trade in capital goods are obvious
examples.
Technology trade can be used to supplement -- as a substitute for or a
complement to

local capabilities as well as to augment them. 35

Implicit in

the import of any technological element is a decision to rely on foreign
rather than local capabilities.

Where the capabilities do not exist locally,

the decision is a choice not to develop them through means that involve
indigenous effort.

A great deal of technological development is import

substitution to replace foreign capabilities with indigenous ones.

The

benefits extend beyond simple import replacement to include dynamic economies
of various forms.

But technological development can not reasonably be seen as

having the objective of progressive import substitution for all of the
elements of technology.

Even the most advanced countries are far from

technological autarchy.

Notions of efficiency and comparative advantage are

as important to technological development as they are to other kinds of
development.
It is economically appropriate to develop the capability to supply some
elements of technology -- or to make rather than buy it -- only if the net
benefit of doing so is positive.

The difficulty here lies not in the

principle of make-buy decisions but in the practice.

Costs of developing a

capability can often be determined with some precision; they are the
investment expenditures needed to create the capability, including the higher
expenses and greater risks relative to imports which may be incurred as
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initial experience applying the capability is acquired.
readily be determined.

Benefits can not so

The direct benefit of import replacement in terms of

foreign exchange savings is no harder to determine for technological
development projects than for those of other kinds.

The problem is in

assessing the other, indirect but potentially more important, benefits.
Technological development is a cumulative process in which capabilities
acquired during the present can provide important foundations for making
technological changes of acquiring other capabilities in the future.

It is

difficult at best to foresee all of the consequences that may follow from
foundations presently being laid, and to evaluate the corresponding benefits.
Technology trade contributes to technological development when it
augments local capabilities.

But, sometimes overlooked is a simple fact

trade involving elements of technology is meant to provide the elements, not
the capabilities to supply them, certainly not as a direct or immediate
consequence of their being provided.

Nonetheless, the relationship of

elements involved to capabilities enhanced is complicated because capabilities
that are ostensibly meant to be developed are often not.

Plants established

under turnkey projects, for example, often continue years later to produce
well under their design capacity owing to insufficient local effort to develop
the requisite production capabilities.

But just as intended results are often

not achieved owing to insufficient effort, so too others can be achieved on
the basis of atypical effort.

Trade of any form can provide wherewithal for

at least some forms of learning given sufficient will and capacity to learn.
4.3.

Indicators of Technological Development
In analyzing technological development, one ideally wants to know how

much has been invested in what kinds of capital with what rates of return.

I.
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Unfortunately, such information is not generally available and is exceedingly
difficult to obtain on an aggregate basis for some important forms of
capability acquisition, like those which occur in connection with initial
efforts to attain increased mastery over newly acquainted industrial
technology.

Available instead are data for various indicators related to

distinct aspects of technological capability.

These indicators offer a

limited, but meaningful for the corresponding aspects, way of gauging levels
of technological development across countries.

Together with indices of

overall economic performance, Table 1 displays several indicators for eight
levels of technological development.
The typology of levels shown in Table 1 is taken from Weiss (1990),
which may be consulted for qualitative details about the various attributes of
each level.
indicators. 36

The concern here is with a few illustrative quantitative
In general terms:

Level 1 countries have not yet achieved what

might be considered"basis" levels of technological capabilities in at least
some important sectors.

Basic capabilities are possessed by all of the level

2 countries, but not all have been expanding and improving their capabilities.
Level 1 includes 75 countries having a combined population of one
billion persons.

One tenth of them reside in 16 level la countries (all

small, except Zaire), which have little or no technological infrastructure.
Roughly 20 percent live in 19 level lb countries, where there is some research
capacity in agriculture but virtually none in other sectors.

Countries at

level le, which account for the rest, have good agricultural research capacity
and undertake some industrial research in the public sector.

But they, like

the other level 1 countries, have no industrial R&D capacity in producing
firms.

Table 1
Selected Technological Capability Indicators for Eight Synthesized Levels of Technological Development
Level 1
Devel10ping Countries
Iml~tors

!!
Traditional
Techn_Ql28Y

RFAL GROWTII (1965-90)
GDP per Capita
GDP: Aggregate
Agriculture
Industry
Services

II.

R&D INTENSITY
R&D/GDP (1990)
Aggregate:
Public
Private
Agriculture:
Public
Private
Industry:
Public
Private
Services:
Public
Private
Science/GDP (1990):
Public
Private

!!?

Level 2

Developing Countries

!!:

2a
Mastery of.
Conventional
Technology

First
;emergence

Islands of
Modernization

5.0

.05

~

Transition

Recently
~

OECD
Industriali7.e

.!!

.!!

to

NlC-Hood

NJC-Hood

2.5

2.8
4.0
2.5
3.1

2.5

3.0
6.0
6.0

7.1
8.1
3.1
9.1
10.0

3.5

3.5

.6
.2

.6
1.0

.7
1.2

.7
2.3

.7
.1

.8
.2

.8

.5

1.5
1.5

.3
1.0

.3
1.2

.3
2.3

.05

.1
.2

.3

.5

.5

2.5
2.5
5.0

2.6
2.5

5.0

5.0

5.0

1.5
2.8
2.6
4.5
4.8

.2
0

.2
0

.3
.02

.4
0

.4
0

.5
.01

.05

.05

.05
0

.1
.02

.2

.4

0

.05

.05

0
0

0
0

0
0

.01
0

.05
.05

.02
0

.02
0

.03
0

.04
0

.10
0

.02

.25
.04

.05

.2

.2

.4

.6

.8

1.3

1.0

1.0

.5

.3
.80
.20

.2
.31
1.70

4-5

5
5

2.4
4.7
3.8
5.1

.4

.6

5.3

.1

.20

III.

S&E INTENSITY
S&E/GDP (Index)

IV.

INVENTION INDICATORS
Inventions/S&E•
Invention Import Share
Invention Export Share

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
.9
0

.05
.95

.1
.81

0

.05

.64
.10

INTEUECTUAL PROPERlY RIGHTS
International Recognition
Domestic Use

0
0

0
0

1
0

2-3
1

2-3
2

2-3
4

V.

lndustriali7.e

4

• Number of inventions per scientist and engineer engaged in R&D, in 1989.

Typical Countries:
la: Yemen, Laos; lb: Nepal, Ethiopia; le: Sri Lanka, Kenya; 2a: Malaysia, Turkey, Colombia; 2b: India, Thailand, Mexico; 2c: Korea, Taiwan. Recently industrialized Greece, Portugal, Spain.
Source: authors' estimates.

3.5
1.5
3.1

.5

.40

~
~
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Twenty countries are found at level 2.

Among them, only four [Hong

Kong, (in truth, a colony), Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore] achieved full NIC
(newly industrialized country) status by the 1980s.

Several more countries

[China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (plus, possibly, Chile)] are
currently experiencing development sufficient, if maintained, to qualify as
NICs in the near future.

All of these countries have adopted the macro and

micro economic policies that are required to achieve rapid, technologically
driven growth.

In most of them, public policy explicitly promotes

technological development through the accumulation and utilization of
technological infrastructure.
The figure in the table illuminate several aspects of technological
development; this is notwithstanding various caveats, that go unstated here,
regarding the comparability of such indicators across countries.
first the aggregate figures.

Consider

Public sector investment in applied R&D as a

percent of GDP increases roughly threefold from level la (reliance on
traditional technology) to level 2c (NIC-hood).

Private sector R&D investment

is effectively nil in level 1 countries; it is quite substantial in the NICs,
though well below the OECD country standard.

The availability of scientists

and engineers (S&E) relative to GDP rises in an even more dramatic fashion
across the levels, being greater in the NICs than in countries more developed
than they.

Expenditures on science relative to GDP show a yet even more

pronounced change, as does the domestic patent indicator.
Patent indicators are used to express cross-country differences in the
extent of inventive activity, but they also indirectly reflect differences in
laws governing IPRs.

The IPR indicators appearing at the bottom of the table

are qualitative indexes (using a scale of Oto S) developed by Evenson (1990).
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Countries at levels la and lb do not have functioning IPR systems; moreover,

many of them lack systems that would support an IPR system.

Level 2

developing countries generally have IPR systems of intermediate strength from
the perspective of foreign inventors.

Most of these countries have been

accused of pirating inventions patented abroad, with the NICs having been
regarded as the most serious offenders.

The domestic use indicator

demonstrates the failure of most LDCs to give adequate support to domestic
inventive activity.

Only the NICs use IPRs aggressively as a means of

encouraging domestic R&D.
Virtually no patents are awarded to domestic inventions in level 1
countries; in the NICs, more patents are awarded to domestic inventions
relative to the number of scientists and engineers than in the more advanced
countries.

Nonetheless, as shown by the invention import share figures, which

give ratios of patents granted to foreigners relative to total patents
granted, patents awarded to foreign inventions exceed those granted to
domestic inventions in all LDCs, NICs included.

In turn, the invention export

share data, which give ratios of patents obtained abroad to total patents
awarded domestically, indicate that exports of inventions from LDCs are
practically nil until they come close to achieving NIC status, and that only
the industrialized countries are net exporters of inventions.
The magnitude of the difference in indicators between the lowest and the
highest levels of LDC technological development, particularly in industry,
suggests that a great deal of investment in technological development is
required to achieve NIC-hood.

Much other evidence, some direct and some

indirect, confirms that this is so.

As the NICs' (and, before them, Japan's)

track record reveals, LDCs can grow faster than the advanced countries.

Being
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able to use modern technology without having to expend resources creating it
from scratch, LDCs can -- it appears -- catch up to advanced country levels of
economic development.

But convergence through catchup growth can not happen

in the absence of substantial investment in technological development.

It is

simply not the case, therefore, that LDCs can enjoy a technological free ride
on the road to NIC-dom.
It can be seen from Table 1 that technological development is quite
different in the agricultural and industrial sectors.

There is a rather

sizeable amount of agricultural R&D (in proportion to agricultural GDP) in the
level 1 countries, most of it in public sector experiment stations that
develop new seed varieties and the like.

These research units, which also

exist in the level 2 countries, are linked in a two-way exchange of biological
materials, new knowledge, and R&D personnel to a network of international
research centers; R&D expenditures by the international centers for the
benefit of LDCs (not shown in the table) amount to roughly ten percent of
national expenditures.

Private sector agricultural research is of some

importance in level 2 countries, although it is only in the advanced OECD
countries that private sector R&D is as important as public sector R&D.
In comparison with public sector spending on agricultural R&D, public
expenditure on industrial R&D is low, being greatest -- roughly half as much
(relative to industrial GDP) -- in level 2b countries. 37

Private sector

industrial R&D assumes significant proportions in level 2 countries; among the
NICs, it is roughly three times the value of public sector expenditure -- the
difference is sevenfold in the advanced OECD countries.

However, as will be

discussed below, data on industrial R&D do not capture many related kinds of
technological effort that are disproportionately important at lower levels of
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technological development.

Comparatively little R&D is performed in the

service sector at all levels, though industrialized countries do engage in
considerable health sector R&D.
Table 2 provides data on industrial R&D and IPR utilization in India and
Korea to portray some typical patterns in technologically advanced LDCs.
Korea (level 2) performs more R&D in relation to sales than does India (2b),
but both countries exhibit a roughly similar structure of relative R&D
intensities across industries.

There is little difference between the

countries in their reliance on foreign patents (IOMF, by industry of
manufacture), which are 65 percent of total patents granted in India and 62
percent in Korea.

The number of patents granted to domestic investors (IOMD,

by industry of manufacture) in different sectors demonstrates the relative
strength of chemical and machinery sector research in India; in Korea, it is
the electronic sector that stands out.
Industry of manufacture - sector of use (!OM-SOU) comparisons show that
more than 20 percent of domestic patents in both countries, and more than 48
percent of utility models in Korea, are used in non-manufacturing sectors
where little R&D is performed and few inventions are generated.

This is

especially noteworthy owing to the great technological distances that
characterize many activities in these sectors (see section 5.4).

The

chemicals and machinery industries contribute disproportionately to other
sectors.

Utility model protection, not available in India, is widely used in

Korea, with the number of utility models being 3.7 times the overall total of
patents.

Very few utility models are granted to foreigners in Korea, as in

other countries where they exist.

Utility models are extensively used by the

electronics and machinery industries, but are comparatively little used by the

Table 2
Industrial R&D and Patents in India and Korea
Inventions (1986-88)••

R&D/Sales•
Sector

India

Korea

(1989)

(1989)

India

Utility Models
Korea (1986-88)

Korea

~)MF

IOMD

SOUD

IOMF

IOMD

SOUD

IOMD

SOUD

Agriculture

na

2.16

-

-

46

-

-

73

-

763

Food and Beverage

.50

.52

53

42

91

46

165

227

116

411

Pulp and Paper

.35

.77

31

14

38

28

24

65

145

199

Textiles

.35

.99

56

31

85

121

130

299

458

655

Chemicals

.97

1.37

877

559

352

1309

504

227

137

155

Drugs

1.60

2.19

73

40

118

180

75

174

21

27

+"

\0

Basic Metals

.39

1..11

401

213

171

213

165

193

1590

615

Electronics and
·computers

1.01

4.80

721

284

194

975

682

569

3294

2491

.25

2.36

H74

658

308

1002

634

245

3012

1600

.25

.51

-

129

-

-

100

-

1041

na

.34

-

131

-

-

101

-

590

na

na

-

47

-

81

-

652

na

na

-

-

108

-

-

86

-

358

na

na

-

-

55

-

-

67

-

852

Machinery
Construction
Utilities

-

Trade and Finance
Health
Government and
Education

•
••

Ratio times 100.
IOMF: Industry of manufacture, foreign inventors; IOMD: Industry of manufacture, domestic inventors; SOUD: Sector of use, domestic inventions.
Source: Computerized patent database, International Patent Documentation Center, Vienna.

50

chemical and drug industries.
4.4.

Sectoral Trajectories
The substantial difference in patterns of R&D expenditures between

agriculture and industry across levels of technological development reflects
inherent differences in the underlying logic of technological development in
the two sectors.

As indicated previously, two fundamental phenomena lie

behind the empirical observation that catchup economic growth can not be
achieved without the simultaneous development of technological capabilities.
The first is the circumstantial sensitivity of much technology, which provides
the rationale for the spatial organization of technological effort in
agriculture.

The second phenomenon is the tacitness of much technology.

Agricultural and industrial technology are alike in being characterized by
both circumstantial sensitivity and tacitness.

But the dominant feature, the

one which has exerted the greatest influence in shaping the course of
technological development in the LDCs over the past four decades, has differed
between the two sectors.
Circumstantial sensitivity has played the major role in agriculture.
Strong interaction between the environment and biological material makes the
productivity of agricultural techniques, which are largely embodied in
reproducible material inputs, highly dependent on local soil, climatic, and
ecological characteristics.

Industrial technology is not circumstantially

sensitive in the same way as agricultural technology.

Nonetheless, industrial

processes must nearly always be specifically tailored to the particular
circumstances in which they are being used to achieve economic levels of
productivity.

This is readily comprehensible in cases where the chemical and

physical properties of inputs vary across alternative sources, or where
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product characteristics differ owing to differences in finely-grained
preferences.

Other, not so obvious but still significant, circumstantial

differences relate to matters of scale and scope as well as to established
labor and management conventions.

Investments to adapt technology to local

circumstances are therefore just as warranted in industry as in agriculture.
But industrial adaptation largely involve changes in the design and operation
of capital goods or in ancillary processes rather than changes in primary
material inputs.
The archetypal adaptive efforts in agriculture are undertaken by
scientists using established R&D principles to fashion new inputs; those in
industry are performed by engineers carrying out conventional measurements and
computations to customize new processes and products.

Newly engineered

processes and products in industry are no less inherently "new" than newly
developed inputs in agriculture.

Moreover, the distinct locations of adaptive

effort -- closer to science in agriculture; to engineering in industry -- are
largely a reflection of the language used in the respective sectors.

The

efforts entailed are neither more nor less inherently routine in one sector
than the other.

The significant differences between the sectors as regards

adaptive efforts are found elsewhere; in the first instance, in the scale of
the circumstantially specific effort and in the scope of its application.
Important forms of adaptive agricultural R&D require a substantial
commitment of resources dedicated to developing techniques for a particular
set 0£ agronomic conditions.

The users of the newly developed techniques are

as numerous as the farmers who work subject to those conditions.

In contrast,

adaptive industrial engineering can be accomplished using resources that are
not circumstantially dedicated.

Furthermore, it is a commonplace activity in
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any well executed project to establish industrial facilities.

And most, if

not virtually all, of the adaptations made in the course of designing a
project are highly specific to that project.
Seen comparatively, industrial technology is readily transferable but
not so easily mastered.

Thus tacitness has been the principal factor

conditioning the trajectory of technological progress in industry.

None of

the indicators shown in Table 1 captures the kinds of technological
investments that dominate in the early stages of an industry's development,
when the tacitness of production technology is initially being overcome.

Even

in the technologically most advanced countries, many important innovations
come from sources other than what is formally classified as R&D; the system of
"just-in-time" production scheduling is a notable example.

In other words,

R&D is only one form of technological effort, or activity to improve
technology.

Other forms of technological effort leading to technological

change are the crucial ones as newly established industries begin to progress
beyond rudimentary levels of mastery.
Case study research on infant industries reveals that significant
increases in productivity, where they occur, come initially from technological
efforts related to raw material control, product and process quality control,
production scheduling, repair and maintenance, changes in product mix, as well
as others including episodic trouble-shooting to overcome problems encountered
in the course of operations.

Additional sources of productivity change are

found in many of the distinct tasks related to investment; that is, related to
expanding existing production facilities and establishing new ones.

Infant

industries rarely achieve international competitiveness without having
realized productivity gains from such technological efforts [Bell et al
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(1984)].
Even though the returns to forms of technological effort often appear
from qualitative, case study evidence -- to be quite large, they seldom are
associated with inventions that are patentable abroad.

They do not yield

improvements that are sufficiently inventive relative to the known state of
the art.

Nonetheless, the improvements are not infrequently sufficiently

novel and useful to qualify for petty patent (or utility model) protection in
countries having this form of IPR.

In turn, formal R&D activities typically

commerce only after a substantial degree of capability has been acquired in
production and in at least some aspects of investment.

This is in large part

because of their differentiated nature, but it also reflects some redefinition
of pre-existing technological activities when they are incorporated into the
R&D departments that emerge from the increasing division of labor within firms
among specialized units.
A great deal of costly and purposeful effort must be expended to master
any newly acquired technology, and therefore to achieve its potential
productivity.

This fact is equally relevant in agriculture and in industry.

But the central locus of effort differs in the two sectors:

in industry, it

is found within individual firms; in agriculture, it resides in the complex of
institutions that are engaged in research and extension.

This follows from

the difference between the sectors in what is directly transferable;
production methods in the former, and R&D
latter.

and extension methods in the

Effective mastery of transferred agricultural R&D methods has

entailed substantial costs and has been no less problem ridden than have been
the ventures to establish large scale, sophisticated plants in the industrial
sector.
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5. International Flows of Technology

It is important to distinguish between the fact that technology
developed for one location can generally be employed, given enough resources,
in another location and the fact that its relative economic value in another
location may not be the same as in its original location.

Few models of

technological discovery and diffusion incorporate this distinction, in part
because few are internationally focused.

Models of discovery do recognize

knowledge as a form of inventive germplasm, but they typically fail to include
any meaningfully specified form of knowledge transmission.

Diffusion models

recognize knowledge transmission but generally incorporate little insight into
the adaptive process.

This section examines how technological distances in

agriculture and industry condition the international flow of technology.
5.1

Factors Determining Technological Distance

As noted above, a givun technique or technical change does not have
the same relative value in every circumstance.

This is generally understood

insofar as the effects of factor price differences on the choice of technology
are concerned.

Less generally understood, at least outside of agriculture, is

the effect of physical and social differences across circumstances.

These

differences can also reduce the value of technology as it flows from one
location to others.

Two factors are relevant when assessing disparities in

the value of a technique (or a particular element of knowledge) between
locations.

One is the circumstantial difference between the locations.

The

other is the sensitivity of the technique to circumstantial differences.
Together they determine the technological distance between locations. 38
Circumstantial differences include those in physical (soil, climate,
and length of day, for instance), economic (relative prices, infrastructure,
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and so on), and social (legal systems, transactions costs, and the like)
factors.

Disparate fields of technology exhibit distinct sensitivity

gradients with respect to these factors.

Biological technologies are perhaps

the most highly sensitive to physical factors; crop agriculture is
particularly affected, with some crops (corn, or maize) being more sensitive
than others (wheat).

Mechanical technologies in agriculture exhibit similar

sensitivity, which is reflected, for example, in the existence of myriad types
of plows, cultivators, and harvesting equipment, each suited to a particular
set of soil conditions.
Nearly all technologies are sensitive to relative factor prices, with
the degree of sensitivity being greater the higher is the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor.

Peripheral activities in

manufacturing, activities such as packaging and in-plant materials conveyance,
are particularly sensitive to the wage-rental rat:io.

Most technologies are

also sensitive to what is available from the existing infrastructure, though
infrastructura l deficiencies can often be overcome by complementary
investments to alter circumstances, as when manufacturers invest in auxiliary
power generators to offset frequent disruptions in electricity distribution.
Some technologies, construction being one example, are particularly sensitive
to social factors [see, for example, Sud et al (1976) or Green and Brown
(1976)).

Technology requiring delicate maintenance will perform differently

in different institutional and infrastructural environments.

In short, most

technology is circumstantiall y sensitive in some way.
It is, therefore, fundamentally important to consider both
circumstantial difference and technological sensitivity when considering
whether and how technology may flow from one location to another.

Little
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adaptation is required if circumstantial differences are small or the
sensitivity gradients are flat, but there is still need for investments in
technology in order to accomplish the transfer and master the technology.

If

circumstantial differences are considerable and the sensitivity gradients are
steep, there may be no effective transferability.

In intermediate cases,

where transfers require adaptation to be realized effectively, investments in
creating technology are necessary.

In these cases, foreign technology serves

as parental germplasm which has value only insofar as there is the capability
to invent appropriate offspring and the incentives (IPRs and otherwise) to do
so.

Positive technological distance between advanced and developing
countries is often optimally overcome by adaptive technological effort.
distinct forms of adaptation can be distinguished.

Two

Minor adaptations involve

changes in the technique but leave its core unaffected; for example, running a
loom at higher speed, or replacing an automatic filling mechanism with hand
labor.

In turn, inventive adaptations make use not of the technique but of

the knowledge that underlies it.
inventive germplasm.

Here knowledge from the source serves as

Producers are often observed to undertake minor

adaptations without formal R&D activity.

But inventive adaptations typically

require some kind of formalized R&D capabilities.

As a general rule, minor

adaptation can not overcome great technological distances, only inventive
adaptation has the potential of doing so. 39
National research programs in the public sector, in research
institutes as well as in universities, have recognized knowledge spillovers in
the form of nonrival public goods.

Programs in non-defense related areas, for

example those in agricultural experiment stations, do not seek to withhold
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proprietary information.

On the contrary, they usually endeavor to "extend"

research findings to as many users as possible.
research findings

Moreover, in agriculture,

new plant varieties, for instance -- developed in one

location are freely transmitted to researchers in other locations, nationally
and often internationally as well.

The international agricultural research

centers were established to facilitate international spillovers of germplasm
and of results from pre-technology science more generally.

In recent years,

scholars have increasingly recognized that R&D conducted by private firms may
have significant spillovers.

Jaffe 1986, Romer (1986, 1990), Grossman and

Helpman (1991) others distinguish between firm-specific proprietary knowledge
and public good information that is not proprietary and is valuable to other
firms because it provides inventive germplasm.
5.2

Inventive Adaptation in Agriculture
Technological distance in biological technology can often be

surmounted only through inventive adaptation.

Griliches (1957), in his

pioneering study of the diffusion of hybrid corn in the United States, made
this point forcefully.

He noted that long after farmers in Iowa and Illinois

had adopted hybrid varieties suited to these Corn Belt states, farmers in
Alabama (outside of the Corn Belt) had not yet adopted any hybrid varieties.
This had little to do with the farmers' capabilities.

Rather, differences in

climate and soil between the Corn Belt and Alabama, along with the sensitivity
of hybrid corn to these differences, resulted in there being a large
technological distance between these areas.

Thus, .as Griliches noted, Alabama

farmers could not benefit from hybrid varieties until hybrid research took
place in Alabama, using knowledge acquired in the Corn Belt as inventive
germplasm.

The same lesson applies to most LDCs.

Corn farmers in the
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Philippines got no direct benefit from the 75 years of American hybrid corn
research that produced a tripling of U.S. corn yields.

They indirectly

benefited from previous hybrid research in the U.S. only after the capacity to
undertake inventive adaptation was created in the Philippines.
Technological distance in biological technology is related to
Darwinian processes of natural selection.

Animals and plants evolved into

numerous variegations of species, each suited to a particular environmental
"niche."

The domestication of some animal and plant types led to centuries of

selection by farmers, producing further differentiation within species.

In

rice, for example, more than one hundred thousand "landrace" types within the
0. Sativa species have been selected by farmers since rice was first
cultivated for food.

Each of these landraces had some form of comparative

advantage in the particular niche where it was selected.

Modern plant

breeding has consisted of crossing and selection programs to find improved
genetic combinations.

In rice, virtually all of this work has been undertaken

in publicly supported experiment stations.
The earliest rice improvement research activities were in Japan, where
major gains were made early in this century through improving Japonica
landraces suited to subtropical regions.

It was not until after World War II

that concerted efforts were made to improve the Indica landraces.

As of that

time, rice producers in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and parts of mainland China had
achieved a 50 year technological lead over the tropical rice producing areas.
In the 1950s, an Indica-Japonica crossing program sponsored by the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, coupled with the creation of
the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, gave
major impetus to rice improvement for tropical conditions.

By 1965, many
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national rice breeding programs had been established in tropical countries.
India, for example, had 23 programs in various locations.
breeding programs existed in some 40 countries by 1970.

Around 200 rice
Most had, and have

maintained, a close association with IRRI, which has served as a nodal point
in the transfer of inventive germplasm.
IRRI achieved a breakthrough in 1964 leading to the release of the
semi-dwarf variety IR-8 which, along with other modern varieties (C4-63,
Masuri, TN-1), ushered in the "green revolution" in rice [Hargrove (1979)].
IRRI's IR-8 variety was widely planted after its release in 1966, but by 1970
its yields were severely diminished owing to Darwinian processes of disease
and pest evolution in reaction to its introduction.

The various breeding

programs led by IRRI were able quickly to develop new varieties, comparable in
yields to IR-B's initial levels, but having genetic resistance to the then
common diseases and pests.

By 1975, high yielding semi-dwarf varieties were

planted in 30 percent of Asia's rice area.

Continued varietal development to

incorporate additional pest and disease resistance, cold tolerance, and other
improvements have, in effect, produced a second green revolution leading to
further diffusion of the high yielding varieties, so that they were planted in
roughly 70 percent of Asia's rice area in 1990.

Rice varieties suited to

upland conditions (where irrigation is absent) and to deep water conditions
(prevalent in parts of Southeast Asia) have not yet been developed [Chang
(1989)].
A recent study of varietal development in rice by Gollin and Evenson
(1991) analyzes more than 90 percent of the varietal releases (that is,
successful inventions of improved varieties) of Indica rices since 1965.

It

shows that IRRI has played a relatively small role as a producer of varieties
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-- it accounts directly for only some 17 percent of the varieties released.
Roughly 10 percent of the varieties that were developed in national programs
were released in other countries.

Of more policy relevance are the findings

in regard to parent varieties (the germplasm from which planted varieties are
derived).

IRRI contributed 65 percent of all parent varieties.

National

programs (particularly India's) have also contributed parent material that has
crossed borders.
Studies of wheat technology, where a similar green revolution has
occurred, show a very similar history to that of rice.

Maize (corn)

technology exhibits greater circumstantial specificity than either rice or
wheat.

Most other crops are similar in this regard.

undertaken on livestock.

Fewer studies have been

Huffman and Evenson (1993) report evidence that

circumstantial sensitivity for livestock is less than for crops.
5.3

Measuring the Effects of Technological Distance in Agriculture

We are aware of only one attempt to measure technological distance
directly in order to show its impact on the value of technology transfers.
Evenson (1992) used the following measure technological distance between
locations i and j with respect to all of the techniques that may be used
individually to conduct some given activity:
(3)

where the denominator,

Cii•

is the unit cost of carrying out the activity in

location i using technique i, the optimal choice of technique for that
location; and the numerator,

Cji•

is the unit cost in location i using the

technique that is optimal for location j. 40

This distance measure reflects

both differences in circumstances and sensitivity to those differences.

If

circumstances were identical, or if technology were insensitive to differences
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in circumstances, the optimal choice of technique in both locations would be
the same, and DiJ would equal one.

Values greater than one indicate a

positive technological distance.
This measure is based on existing technology and reflects prior
technological development in the two locations.

But it may also serve as an

indicator of the proximity of their future technological development.

Thus,

it may show the value in location i of research conducted in location j, since
new technology developed for location j must overcome the existing distance if
it is to be useful in location i.

If DiJ equals one, it may be considered

highly likely that inventions in location j will have immediate application in
location i.

More generally, it may be expected that higher values of DiJ

imply lower probabilities of direct transfer and lesser gains from any
indirect transfers that might take place.

However, the use of the measure in

this way may be confounded if research in either location is circumstantiall y
specific, causing Dij to increase over time.

But even with such divergence,

inventions in one location may serve as parental germplasm to others as
illustrated above in the discussion of rice technology.
Evenson (1992) applied the measure to data generated from rice yield
trials in India.

In such trials, common sets of culitvars are planted in each

of many locations, with all varieties being subject to the same experimentally
controlled production conditions in each production location.
rice across regions of India range from 1.05 to 1.67. 41

The values for

They exceed one

entirely because of differences in soil and climate conditions.

They reflect

the fact that farmers may choose among many rice varieties, each having a
comparative advantage in a distinct set of soil and climate conditions.
The distance measures just discussed were used to estimate the
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relative value of rice research conducted elsewhere within India.

The basic

specification was as follows:

(4)
where T1 is a TFP index for district i, D1J is the distance measure,

is the

RJ

depreciated stock of research expenditure in district j, and Z is a vector of
other productivity affecting variables, including irrigation, weather
conditions, and the like.

The estimated value of the alpha parameter is -5.0.

For D1J equal to 1.1, the benefit to region i of one dollar's worth of
research in region j is 0.62 times the benefit of spending a dollar in region
i's own research program; for D1J equal to 1.5, the relative benefit of

research in region j drops to 0.13.

Thus, even when knowledge spillovers are

considered, technological distance greatly affects technology transfer
possibilities.
As will be discussed further below, a number of studies -- in both
agriculture and industry -- have attempted to incorporate technological
distance by utilizing various circumstantial variables when investigating the
value of spillovers [Jaffe (1986), Griliches (1991)].

One line of empirical

research relates productivity measures to, among other variables, separate
research stock variables, one for the region's own R&D and the other for R&D
conducted in regions that are circumstantially close neighbors.

Another line

of research utilizes patent statistics in place of R&D expenditures.

These

studies have shown that individual regions generally do benefit from research
in other regions that are circumstantially not too far distant.

But they have

equally demonstrated that local research capacity is required in order to gain
spillover benefits from research done elsewhere.
5.4

Technology Transfer in Industry
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In substantial contrast to policy makers dealing with agricultural
technology, many policy makers concerned with industrial technology appear to
believe that technological distance depends solely on economic circumstances;
that is, that industrial technology is not sensitive to physical and social
circumstances. 42

Following from this belief is their view that the only

issues of consequence with respect to industrial technology relate to the
dependence of choice of technique on factor prices.

Often implicit is the

corollary notion that LDCs can simply free-ride on industrial technology
created in the advanced countries, thereby avoiding the cost of creating
technological capabilities.

But, as argued previously, developing countries

do not obtain industrial technology as "manna from advanced countries" even if
the technology is insensitive to circumstances.

Owing to the tacitness of

technology, substantial investments in acquiring production capability are
always required to master a new technology.
There are, as yet, no direct estimates of technological distances for
industrial technologies.

Nonetheless, there is a great deal of evidence that

product and process designs alike are sensitive to differences in
circumstances in virtually all industries.

For example, observers of

invention in India conclude that much of it consists of adapting foreign
technology to local circumstances [see, for example, NCAER (1971), Bhagwati
and Srinivasan (1975), Desai (1984), and Lall (1987)].

Such adaptation is

motivated by differences between developed and developing countries in things
like income levels, consumer preferences, factor costs, climatic conditions,
and material input characteristics.

Sometimes these differences are

artificially created by import-substitution policy regimes, which force
producers to purchase particular inputs from domestic sources that supply
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inputs of inferior quality relative to their foreign counterparts.

To make

the most effective use of such inputs, firms are often forced to undertake a
form of policy-induced technological effort, with low social returns [Teitel
(1987)].
Important evidence of adaptation in response to significant
circumstantial differences comes from the engineering activity that occurs
whenever new production facilities (or additions to existing facilities) are
being established.

It is hidden from casual observation which fails to

recognize that engineering design involves tailoring technology to local
circumstances.

Additional evidence comes from case studies of the use of

industrial technology in LDCs.

As noted previously (section 4.4), these

studies demonstrate that production capability is in large part acquired
through a variety of technological efforts which lead to productivity
enhancing technological changes.

Many of the numerous changes uncovered can

only be described as having been intended to adapt the technology to local
circumstances [see, for example, Mikkelsen (1984)].

Not always clear from the

information provided is whether the adaptions are motivated by differences in
physical, social, or economic circumstances.
related to differences in relative prices.

Some of them are obviously
Otsuka et al (1988) provide a

notable study of adaptations to economic circumstances in the development of
Japan's textile industry.

But there are also obvious cases of adaptations to

differences in physical circumstances.

For instance, producers of cement,

steel, and other natural resource-intens ive products have often been found to

alter their processes to adapt them to peculiar raw material characteristics
[Dahlman (1979)].
Dahab's (1986) study of farm machinery producers in Brazil is
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instructive in this regard.

The industry was established by multinational

firms that progressively lost market share to indigenous producers who first
imitated and subsequently adapted the multinationals models, making them
better suited the local circumstances.

Within 20 years the indigenous

producers dominated the markets for all but the most complex models. 43
Patent and utility model protection appears to have given the indigenous
producers important incentives in this process.
There is very little direct evidence about sensitivity to social
circumstances.

In some cases it is thought that they can preclude the use of

labor-intensive methods that would otherwise be the optimal choice.

Pack

{1987), for example, argues that labor-intensive weaving techniques which were
used effectively in Korea can not be used in some African settings because of
social factors which preclude sustained accumulation of the necessary skills.
Indirect evidence of sensitivity to circumstantial differences comes
from international patent data.

If technological distances were nil, one

would not observe much domestic invention in LDCs, since they could simply
free-ride.

But, as reported in Evenson (1990) and reflected in data provided

for India and Korea in Table 2 (in section 4.3), there is domestic invention
in a number of LDCs.

Reflecting perceived invention opportunities, ratios of

R&D to sales differ among performing industries in a roughly similar pattern
in India and Korea.

In turn, reflecting inherent differentials in

technological distance, proportions of patented inventions having foreign and
domestic origins also differ among industries in both countries.

If there

were no differences in technological distances across industries, one would
expect to find similar ratios of imported to total inventions in all
industries.
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Table 3 provides complementary evidence of sectoral differences in
technological distance.

The indices reported there are average ratios, among

~ight OECD countries, of patents obtained by domestic inventors in their home
country to patents obtained by them in the other countries.

A value of 7.0,

for example, would indicate that inventions originating in any one country
were patented in all eight countries.

This could only happen if all

inventions were equally valuable across the range of diverse circumstances
present in all eight countries, which would mean that technological distances
were nil.
3.0.

No index has a value higher than 4.5, while most are well below

This is consistent with the notion that most inventions are adaptive

modifications to local circumstances of other inventions having more extensive
application.

But it also appears that industries differ considerably in the

potential for direct technology transfer owing to intrinsic differences in
technological distance.
The table shows index values both by industry of manufacture and by
sector of use.

The highest ratios for industry of manufacture are found in

drugs, chemicals, and office machinery, which also have high ratios of foreign
to domestic inventions in both Korea and India.

These industries are

characterized by relatively low technological distances.

The ratios for

sector of use afford a comparison of technological distances in the
agricultural sector with those in other sectors.

While technological distance

in agriculture is indeed comparatively large (i.e., the inter-country
patenting index has a relatively low value), agriculture does not exhibit the
greatest technological distance on this measure.

Several manufacturing

sectors appear to be characterized by larger technological distances, as do
most service sectors. 44

Reference to Table 2 shows that the non-manufacturing
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Table 3
Sectoral Inter-country Patenting Indices
(Eight Countries 1969-1987)

Inter-country Patenting Indices
Industry of
Manufacture

Finance - Business
Wood & Furniture
Construction
Transportation Services
Ships
Other Manufacturing
Other Services
Fabricated Metals
Mining

Aerospace

1.620

1.664
1.719
1.806
1.842
1.876

Sector of
Use

1.687
1.705
1.735
1.767
1.779
1.814
1.866
1.887
1.903
1.929

Other Transport
Agriculture
Communication - Utilities
Health Services
Motor Vehicles

2.009

1.961
1.966
2.002
2.031
2.044

Other Machinery
Food, Drink & Tobacco
Electrical Machinery
Electronic Equipment
Ferrous Metals

2.060
2.271
2.122
2.199
2.195

2.084
2.106
2.185
2.201
2.217

Instruments
Stone, Clay & Glass
Petroleum Refineries
Rubber and Plastics
Paper and Printing

2.015
2.093
2.179
1.952
1.900

2.239
2.260
2.264
2.381
2.470

Non-Ferrous Metals
Textiles and Clothing
Chemicals
Drugs
Office Machinery

2.548
2.019
2.788
2.696
2.071

2.483
2.488
2.788
3.039
4.345

1.642

Note: Sectors are arrayed in ascending order of using sector indices.
Source: Evenson (1993a)
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sectors in India and Korea also utilize inventions from other sectors and
that, in Korea, the utility model particularly benefits these sectors.
Further evidence that technological distance matters for industrial
sectors is found in recent research by Englander and Evenson (1993).

Their

study examines the relationship between domestic as well as foreign R&D
expenditures and TFP growth in 11 industries across 11 OECD countries.
Foreign expenditures include only those by technologically more advanced
countries, aggregated using labor productivity differentials to weight
expenditure values.

In a cross-industry analysis incorporating the technology

distance indices, they found that foreign R&D expenditure by technological
leaders is associated with increasingly higher domestic TFP growth as
technological distance diminishes.

No less important, they also found that

domestic R&D expenditure appears to be increasingly more productive in TFP
growth terms as technological distance increases.
In sum, industrial technology is circumstantially sensitive, but this
is manifested in a different way than in the case of agricultural technology.
In industry, differences in circumstances do not generally preclude the direct
transfer of techniques (appropriately engineered) as they typically do in
agriculture.

But once the techniques are transferred, and given sufficient

attention to the acquisition of appropriate capabilities, further adaptive
technological changes occur in response to evolving perceptions of local
circumstances.

In agriculture, inventive capabilities are required to

accomplish most transfers; in industry, the transfer of techniques, when
effective, triggers a process of simultaneous capability acquisition and
technology adaptation, leading ultimately to patenting.
The adaptation of industrial technology to LDC circumstances has,
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however, to be seen in historical perspective to be completely understood.
Technology developed in advanced countries may cascade through several
circumstantially specific stages of adaptation before it reaches the poorest
countries, with each successive stage making the technology less suited to
advanced countries but more suited to less developed ones.

By adopting the

appropriate choice of technology, LDCs that are today at a particular stage of
development can benefit from adaptations made by countries that have
previously passed through the same stage.

For example, some of the

adaptations in textile machinery made by the Japanese in the early 1900s still
remain in use elsewhere.

Thus, assuming that knowledge of previous

adaptations has not been lost, the need for adaptive effort with respect to
economic circumstances is less.

More generally, different vintages of

technology, if not obsolete, may offer alternatives tailored to a variety of
circumstances.
Nonetheless, adaptation is sometimes necessary before transfer.
Mikkelsen (1984) showed that the key activity enabling Philippine rice
producers to benefit from rice threshing technology developed in Japan was the
adaptive invention of a prototype thresher at IRRI.

Using this prototype,

local inventors made the specific adaptations required to enable the economic
use of threshers in the many different circumstances in which they are now
used in the Philippines.

Mikkelson concluded that utility model protection

was an important factor stimulating the post-IRR! inventive activity.

What is

particularly notable in this example is the implication that the available IPR
protection was insufficient to elicit the initial transfer.

Had a private

producer played IRRI's role, it would have been unable to appropriate
sufficient returns owing to the rapid entry of niche-specific competitors.

In
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different circumstances, absent widely diffused metal working abilities, a
private producer might have been able to appropriate sufficient returns.
But it is not always the older vintages that are the most appropriate
(either directly or indirectly) for LDCs.

Vernon's (1966) product cycle model

has exactly the opposite implication; technologies are not transferred (or
transferable) to LDCs until they have matured to the point where processes
have been invented that enable the use of unskilled labor in mass production.

But Vernon's model relates to a different phenomenon, namely the evolution of
frontier technology.

Moreover, it is not the complete process which is

transferred, but only those parts which are amenable to labor intensive
production; assembly activity rather than component production, for example.
6.

Technological Investment in the Private Sector
Studies of various forms of investment (or the lack thereof) in

technology are important for policy purposes because of the need to understand
the factors that normally stimulate such investment.

There are many issues,

including matters of appropriability, that must be addressed.
choices are important as well as private sector decisions.

Public sector

Unfortunately, we

have relatively little evidence from LDCs about the determinants of investment
activities by private firms. 45
6.1

Capability Acquisition and Technological Change
Case studies of technological development in industry at the firm

level clearly indicate that many important forms of investment in technology
are not captured in conventional measures.

This is especially true of

investments that are made in the course of mastering newly acquired
technology.

As was previously indicated, most of these investments do not

count as formal R&D.

Nonetheless, they simultaneously lead to
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productivity-enhancing technological changes and to the accumulation of
technological capability.

In both respects, they are the means whereby the

tacitness of technology and of local circumstances is overcome through
experience-based learning and complementary additions of technological
elements from outside the firm.

Moreover, they contribute the foundations

from which the capability effectively to undertake formal R&D evolves.

In

short, without them there can be no meaningful technological development.
One of the few generalizations about technology that has no known
exceptions is the observation that no newly acquired technology is initially
operated at its potential productivity.

No less generally true is the

principle that the initial level of productivity as well as the time and
resources required to achieve the potential productivity depend on the
starting level of mastery.

Three factors appear to be most important among

those responsible for these phenomena.

First, labor can not effectively be

trained apart from experience in the activity, while labor training is an art
that improves in effectiveness with practice that is consciously monitored.
Second, technologies are typically systems of elements that can be integrated
in various ways.

Achieving the proper integration in the operation of

technology requires experimentation, which in turn is an art based on
experience.

Third, as stressed throughout this survey, technologies are

circumstantially sensitive and much of the requisite knowledge about local
circumstances and how technology responds to them in its operation can only be
acquired through experimentation.
Achievement of mastery in the senses just discussed is by no means
automatic; it requires systematic attention to the lessons of experience and
often entails the search for elements of technology that were initially
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neglected out of ignorance of their importance [Dahlman et al (1987)].

Thus

the body of case study research and anecdotal evidence includes numerous cases
of failure to achieve the minimum mastery needed to attain the levels of
productivity expected when the physical investment was undertaken.

It also

includes numerous cases of unforeseen success in achieving sufficient mastery
to exceed the expected levels of productivity.

In the former cases there is

no technological development to benefit subsequent investments in implementing
the same or similar technology.

In the latter cases there is technological

development so that subsequent investments are implemented with increasing
efficiency due to spillovers from previous experience.
In truth, the degree of mastery that is required to achieve the
expected productivity depends on the choices made at the stage of engineering
design and the care with which those choices are embodied in the productive
facility.

It is much easier to master the operation of a well designed and

executed project than to overcome the deficiencies of a poorly engineered and
executed one.

But the ability to make effective choices and to oversee their

implementation requires considerable mastery of the technology. 46

Indeed, it

requires mastery well beyond that needed for efficient startup under the best
possible conditions.

This is why it is frequently the case that significant

adaptations of the technology are required to realize the expected
productivity.

These adaptions are not unlike those often found to be

necessary in order to respond effectively to changes in market conditions or
to enable higher than expected productivity levels, which is typically
accomplished by making changes that exploit local circumstances.
Included among the enormous variety of adaptive changes that have been
observed are various means of capacity stretching, bottleneck breaking,
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improved by-product utilization, alterations in raw material sources,
modifications in product design, and expansions of product mix.

It is from

these kinds of changes that the complex of production and investment
capabilities that is needed to achieve sustained productivity increases is
derived.

Without sustained productivity increases, international

competitiveness can neither be achieved nor maintained in the face of the
continual productivity improvements by firms at the leading edge of global
competitiveness.

Very few of the kinds of changes just enumerated take place

in the context of formal R&D or yield inventions that can be patented abroad.
Some of them are amenable to utility model protection, but most are simply
improvements in various aspects of operation or engineering practice.

It is

generally only after the achievement of higher levels of mastery acquired
through making these kinds of changes that firms go on to establish formal R&D
and then begin to engage in inventive activities which may ultimately lead to
patenting.

But very important is the fact that mastery achieved in relation

to these kinds of changes is what enables the efficient acquisition of
technology through means other than formal purchase.
It is a striking fact that formal purchase of technology in complete
packages through such means as turnkey plant contracts and licensing, plus
their functional equivalent

direct foreign investment, accounts for only a

modest share of the technology that has been mastered in Korea, to cite a
particularly revealing case about which relatively much is known [Westphal et
al (1984)).

In many instances formal purchase contributed the seed from which

were developed the capabilities to acquire vastly more additional technology
through means other than formal purchase.

Sometimes the process of acquiring

additional elements of technology was akin to apprenticeship -- participation
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with foreigners in project execution and startup provided the initial
learning.

Other times the process was one of imitation through sequential

reverse engineering leading to the emergence of new processes and products.
But regardless of how one might characterize the underlying processes, the
basic principle was successively to master individual elements in a
progression running from the simpler to the more complex.

It would therefore

be incorrect to characterize the process as one of reinvention; it is rather
one of step-by-step mastery, though the successive steps can often be so
rapidly achieved as to seem to have been undertaken simultaneously.
Thus it is that an effective process of technological development
through the focused acquisition of production and investment capabilities can
provide the means to assimilate and then adapt a great deal of foreign
technology on the basis of selectively importing some of the elements while
developing the others locally.

The process is externally constrained only

insofar as key elements of the technology are proprietary and not available
through arms-length purchase.

In the past, judging by the experience of the

successful export-led economies, relatively little of the technology required
for rapid industrialization has been proprietary.

In turn, again judging by

their experience, purchases of imported capital goods play a vitally important
role in the overall process.

First has come learning how to use imported

equipment; learning how to produce equipment has taken place more slowly.
Additionally, a good deal of the information needed to augment basic
capabilities has come from the buyers of exports who freely provided product
designs and offered technical assistance to improve process technology in the

context of their sourcing activities.

Some part of the efficacy of export-led

development must therefore be attributed to externalities derived from
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exporting.
In sum, much -- perhaps most -- of the investment required by firms to
achieve the NICs' level of private sector technological development can not be
inferred from conventional statistical sources relating either to technology
purchase or invention.
tip of an iceberg.

The more readily observable investments are but the

But this analogy, while descriptively evocative, is

analytically misleading because one can not infer the extent of hidden
investment simply on the basis of knowing the magnitude of the visible
investment.

The fact remains that most LDCs have so far failed to achieve a

sufficient volume of investment in acquiring technological capabilities.

The

analogy is additionally misleading insofar as the warranted mix of
technological investments shifts with the progress of technological
development toward the more readily observable forms.

But this consideration

is as yet of li·ttle real consequence for most LDCs.
6.2.

Direct Foreign Investment
The effects of direct foreign investment on the accumulation of

domestic technological assets are complex and not easily disentangled.

As a

means of technology transfer, direct foreign investment is, in the first
instance, a substitute for the development of indigenous capabilities.

But

foreign firms are no less affected by the circumstantial sensitivity of
technology and the tacitness of local circumstances than are domestic firms.
Thus they may generally be expected to invest in the accumulation of specific
technological assets and to undertake adaptive technological changes.

But

this does not mean that they necessarily make the same choices that would be
made by domestic firms acting in their place.

In some respects they may be

expected, at least initially, to make better choices, because they can rely on
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capabilities developed through previous experience elsewhere and because they
face lower costs of searching for and evaluating technology.

But in other

respects they may make worse choices, because they lack experience in the
local circumstances and because their objectives are to varying degrees
externally determined.
Possible differences in behavior between domestic and foreign firms
have in fact been a central issue in the literature on direct foreign
investment.

Helleiner's survey (Chapter 28 in Volume 2 of this Handbook) of

this literature largely focuses on behavior with respect to technology choice
and concludes that, if anything, it appears that foreign firms may typically
make superior choices.

As Helleiner implies, there is much less evidence

about behavior with respect to the accumulation of technological assets over
time; what evidence there is does not appear to support any particular
generalization apart from the statument that ill-advised policies can lead
both domestic and foreign firms to the wrong kinds of behavior.
may be no valid generalization beyond this one.

Indeed, there

Consider Korea and Singapore,

two countries that have achieved spectacular development success.

One, Korea,

is an outlier in having relied relatively little on foreign firms for
technology transfer.

The other, Singapore, is an outlier in the opposite

direction, having continually and extensively relied on foreign firms for its
technological development.
Considerable attention has recently been given to the possibility that
foreign firms may contribute importantly to technological development through
spillovers to indigenous firms.

The most obvious form of possible externality

occurs through the mobility of labor trained by foreign firms.

Other

externalities may result from the transfer of technology to their local
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suppliers.

Foreign firms often appear to have important indirect,

demonstration effects as well; for example, opening avenues of profitable
activities which are soon travelled by local imitators.

Several attempts have

been made to test for spillover effects using firm-level data that distinguish
among sectors as well as between domestic and foreign ownership. 47

Spillovers

are inferred if the productivity performance of domestic firms is related to
some measure of the extent of participation by foreign firms.
these studies have been mixed.

Results from

Moreover, such studies can at best show that

the evidence is consistent with the notion of spillovers.

But case study

research, like that reported in Rhee and Belot (1990), does demonstrate that
real spillovers do sometimes occur.

In turn, other forms of technology

transfer, for example construction of turnkey plants, may have externalities
of equal or greater significance for productivity growth in domestic firms.
6.3.

Foreign and Domestic Technology:

Compl.ements or Substitutes

Several studies have investigated the relationship between domestic
R&D and the purchase of disembodied foreign technology.

The typical

methodology has been to use data at the level of firms or industries to
regress formal R&D expenditures or some other measure of domestic inventive
effort on technology purchase and other explanatory variables such as sales
[Lall (1983), Katrak (1985, 1990), Kumar (1987), Braga and Wilmore (1991)).
Blumenthal (1979) followed the converse approach, regressing technology
purchases per employee on R&D expenditures per employed.

In a similar vein,

Katrak (1991) performed a probit estimation of the probability that technology
is imported as a function of the R&D expenditures of firms.

Mohnen and Lepine

(1991) used Canadian data to estimate a factor demand system in which
technology purchase is one of the variable factors and R&D is treated as a
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fixed input.

Studies of the foregoing kind are not conclusive owing to
specification errors of several types.

First, either R&D or technology

purchase is taken to be exogenous, making the estimates subject to
simultaneity bias [Arora (1991)].

Second, there is a selection bias in most

of these studies because firms are sampled on the basis that they perform R&D,
purchase technology, or do both [on the general subject of selection bias, see
Maddala (1983)].

Deolalikar and Evenson (1989) used Indian industry level data to
estimate a factor demand system in which both inventive effort (proxied by
patents granted during the period) and foreign technology purchase are treated
endogenously.

They found that both variables are significantly and positively

related to stocks of U.S. patents in the same industries, but they were unable
to identify the relationship between domestic patentin5 and foreign technology
purchase in the absence of prices for each.
problems using Indian firm level data.

Fikkert (1993) tackled both

His sample includes firms that do no

R&D and/or no technology purchasing and a maximum likelihood estimation
technique is used to take account of corner solutions in these respects.
Domestic R&D and foreign technology purchases were found to be substitutes.
In other words, a lower effective price for technology purchases induces an
increase in technology licensing and a reduction in local R&D and vice versa.
Basant (1993), using a different approach based on multinomial logit analysis,
came to a similar conclusion.
Case studies of technological effort show that technology purchase and
local R&D are in some cases complements and in others substitutes.

They are

complements when R&D is used in the process of assimilating and adapting
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purchased technology.

They are substitutes when R&D is used to develop some

element of technology that could otherwise have been purchased.

Basant and

Fikkert interpret their estimates as demonstrating the preponderance of the
latter case in India, which they take to be evidence that the Indian
government succeeded in its objective of stimulating domestic technological
development through regulating the import of technology.

However, neither

study was able to determine how the relationship between technology purchase
and local R&D would have been changed if alternative policies had been
followed.

If only for this reason, their finding that domestic R&D and

technology purchase are substitutes can not be generalized to other LDCs
following different policies.
But their findings in other respects may be of greater immediate
relevance.

They found strong evidence of spillover effects from domestic and

foreign invention, with increases in the stock of either being a stimulus to
increased local R&D.

Moreover, both found that increases in the stock of

foreign inventions were associated with greater expenditures on technology
purchase.

In subsequent joint work [Basant and Fikkert, (1993)], they

determined that the private rate of return to domestic R&D in India was at
least as high as that found in developed countries, while the private rate of
return to technology purchases was much higher still. 48

Taken together, these

results imply that increases in domestic R&D and technology purchase
expenditures would have been highly profitable in private terms, and -- at
least in the case of R&D -- even more so in social terms.

The Indian policy

regime over the period examined by these authors was characterized by
relatively weak patent protection and regulations that discouraged technology
purchases.

On both counts it appears that India's policies did not stimulate
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as much technological effort as could have been productively undertaken.
Case study evidence clearly implies that accessing foreign elements of
technology and investing in technology creation are complements in the
fundamental sense that firms which are found to have the most effective
approaches to managing their technological development do both [see, for
example, Bell et al (1984) or Dahlman et al (1987)].

But not all access to

elements of foreign technology is through formal purchase; nor are all
investment~ in technology creation done in the context of formal R&D activity.
Thus the relationship between formal purchase and formal R&D is a quite
separate matter.

Nonetheless, there is an obvious reason for thinking that

these expenditures must effectively be substitutes over at least some range of
technological development.

As was discussed in section 4, much of

technological development involves substituting for imports of technology and
related technological services.

One result, as was seen in Table 1, is an

increase in the share of domestic relative to imported inventions, which
suggests that "make" does effectively substitute for "buy."
But, in truth, the simple make versus buy characterization is
fundamentally misguided.

This is not merely because the choice to buy is

limited by the existing stock of purchasable technology.

More importantly,

absent this limitation, it is because effective decisions to make typically
come after basic elements of technology have been bought by one means. or

another. 49

Efforts to make technology are rarely successful in economic terms

if not founded on domestic experience using elements of the technology,
experience which leads naturally to minor adaptive changes and, ultimately, to
patentable inventions.

Thus decision making is more aptly characterized in

terms of "buy, then decide about make", with the fundamental make choices
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being related to particular elements of the technology.
More generally, efficient technological effort builds on both the
cumulation of domestic capabilities and the evolution of global technology.
Thus indigenous adaptations to local circumstances and the incorporation of
continuing foreign technological advances are importantly complementary
activities.

In the past, countries that have sought technological

self-sufficiency have sacrificed efficiency gains that can be had by directing
technological efforts to derive the greatest advantage from the utilizing
global technology.

Once created, their R&D establishments typically became

locked into programs that focused on improving outmoded technologies
introduced at their inception.

The Indian automotive, fertilizer, and textile

industries, for example, have suffered greatly from the resulting
technological isolation, as did the industries of most socialist regimes.

In

other countries, many in Latin America for example, technological isolation
was not so much associated with the early creation of R&D establishments as
with later efforts to generate R&D by restricting access to foreign
technology.
6.4.

IPR Protection and Investment Behavior
Studies that attempt to determine the incentive effects of IPR

protection on decisions to invent and imitate fall into two categories:
studies of behavior, either of firms holding patents or of firms that conduct
systematic R&D and may choose patenting as one option for appropriating
returns; and studies -- such as that by Fakes and Schankerman (1986) -- that
try to establish for different sectors the intrinsic value of a patent in
comparison to the value of other incentives driving private R&D activity.
following discussion focuses on the former studies.

The
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A number of surveys rank patents as being relatively unimportant among
the determinants of R&D investments [Scherer (1986) and Nogues (1990) provide
reviews].

However, a 1981 survey of American firms in the chemical, drug,

electronics, and machinery industries found that these firms would not have
introduced about one-half of the patented inventions that composed the sample
without the benefit of patent protection [Mansfield et al (1981)).

A survey

in Canada, a major technology importer, also concluded that patents were not
the dominant factor in decisions by American firms to invest in establishing
Canadian subsidiaries [Firestone (1971, ch.s 7 and 10)).

Watanabe (1985, pp.

217,250) reports on a survey of over two thousand Japanese firms conducted in
1979-80.

In this survey, nearly 30 percent of the firms cited the patent

system as being the most important incentive to industrial innovation;
considered next most important were tax and other financial incentives, with
roughly 13 percent of the firms citing each respectively.

But patent

protection ranked third in importance in the motivation of individual
researchers, of whom only some 12 percent considered it the most important
incentive to them as individuals.

More important in their eyes were

competition with other firms (23 percent) and academic or technical interest
(17 percent).

Greif (1987), however, shows that R&D investments and patent

applications are closely correlated in the Federal Republic of Germany,
suggesting that patents have a stimulative impact.
The survey evidence on the stimulus effect of patents suggests that
the benefits of a patent system vary across industries.

Industry studies show

that patents are important for some industries, particularly for
pharmaceuticals.

For example, in their effort to simulate the effects of

weaker patent protection in the United Kingdom, Taylor and Silberton (1973,
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ch. 14) found that the most affected industries would be pharmaceuticals and
specialty chemicals, the two industries that use patents most intensively.
Similar findings were obtained by Levin et al (1987) when they interviewed
over 600 R&D managers in major U.S. firms.

In most of the lines of business

covered by that survey, patents were rated as being less effective than trade
secrets or sales and service activities as means for securing returns from
R&D; the notable exceptions were pharmaceuticals and scientific instruments.
The foregoing evidence seemingly gives only weak support to the
proposition that patent protection stimulates R&D.

But it must be recognized

that much of it is attitudinal evidence comparing patents with other
incentives in settings where patent protection has typically been available
for long periods.

It is not uncommon for respondents in such surveys to

understate the importance of institutions that have long been commonplace.
Furthermore, the evidence does not generally address the question of what
would happen if the patent system were eliminated.

Clearer, stronger evidence

of its importance is found in the fact that all developed countries have been
strengthening their own patent systems over time.
In turn, there is strong evidence that patents do not effectively
deter imitation by rivals for very long. 50

This is in part because patents

carry the means for their own destruction in the sense that they disclose to
rivals the information needed to reproduce the invention.

Mansfield (1985)

conducted a random survey of 100 U.S. firms in 13 major manufacturing groups
that yielded an estimate of the average time period between a firm's decision
to commit to a new process or product and the point at which the detailed
nature of the new process or product was known to its rivals.

The period was

roughly one year for product inventions and less than 10 months for process
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inventions.

Patents were indicated to be a chief conduit through which the

knowledge spread.
Moreover, it does not appear from this research that patent protection
prevented competitors from entering the market.

Firms participating in

Mansfield's survey believed that patent protection postponed rival entry for
only a matter of months in the case of about one-half of the sample
innovations.

For only 15 percent of the sampled inventions was it thought

that patent protection delayed imitation by more than four years.

Though

patents were considered to increase the costs of rival imitation, the
additional cost was not considered sufficient to markedly affect the speed of
entry by rivals.

The survey by Levin et al (1987) also found that imitation,

even in the presence of a patent, occurs rapidly, in part because of the
information that patents convey to competitors.

But the fact that imitation

takes place rapidly does not necessarily mean that patents have little effect
on inventors' revenues, either during the period before imitation or after.
The studies discussed to this point do not allow one to draw any
direct conclusions about the behavior of firms in LDCs.
few studies of firms in LDCs that are directly pertinent.

But there are very
One study is that

conducted jointly in Brazil by the Action Center for Small and Medium Sized
Companies, the Ministry of Industrial Development and Commerce, and the
American Chamber of Commerce, cited by Sherwood (1990, pp. 115-6).
Approximately eighty percent of the 377 firms responding declared that they
would invest more in internal R&D and in labor training if better legal
protection were available.

In turn, we know of no studies that have

rigorously demonstrated losses or damages in any country from strong IPRs.
Even for those few level 2b and 2c countries (in Table 1) with pirating
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capacity, there is little evidence that stronger IPRs would have resulted in
higher net payments for technology from abroad.

But there is evidence that

suppliers of technology respond to weak IPRs and piracy by withholding
technology, often going to considerable trouble in the process [Mansfield
(1993)].

Thus countries with weak IPR systems may suffer a double loss,

offering insufficient incentives for domestic inventive effort while also
experiencing a diminished flow of foreign inventions that would further
stimulate local efforts.
7.

Returns to Technological Activities
The direct approach to the study of technological development is to

evaluate technological efforts as "projects" and to apply standard economic
evaluation methods.

In principle, one should be able to estimate productivity

consequences (benefits) as well as costs, thereby to assess the economic
growth consequences of technology investments.

In addition, one should be in

a position to evaluate distributional consequences.

The evaluation methods

for such studies, while complex and technical, do not necessarily depend on a
detailed technical understanding of the research activities themselves.

These

types of evaluations, along with case study evidence, constitute the bulk of
the empirical foundations on which our understanding of technological
development in both developed and developing countries is based.
This section reviews studies of the returns to investments in both the
agricultural and industrial sectors; it also considers the conclusions from
studies of distributional impacts.

For agriculture, we have a large number of

studies evaluating research and extension programs in both developed and
developing countries.

For industry, we are less well situated.

We have very

few studies for LDCs.

We are well aware of the limited relevance of the
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empirical studies undertaken in developed countries for developing countries,
but we believe a discussion of the developed country evidence is useful
nonetheless.
7.1

Benefit-cost Studies for Agriculture
Two methodological approaches to project and program evaluation have

been followed in the literature.

Both of them are based on TFP growth

accounting principles (discussed in section 2.5).

The first is based on

direct imputation and is an application of project evaluation methods.

The

second approach is statistical and entails construction of variables derived
from investments in research, extension, schooling, infrastructure, and other
TFP enhancing activities.

These variables are typically expressed in "stock

service-flow" terms, with appropriate temporal and spatial weights to reflect
time lags, depreciation, and spillovers.

These variables are sometimes termed

"meta" variables to distinguish them from conventional input variables.
Statistical frameworks used have included:
o TFP decompositions using hedonic regression specifications, where TFP
measures are regressed on meta variables of the kind just discussed;
o production function specifications where meta variables are included
together with conventional inputs in a production function framework
that is usually Cobb-Douglas in form; and,
o profit functions or output supply - input demand systems which
include meta variables and rely on duality theory plus the assumption of
competitive markets to obtain estimates of production function
parameters.
The key issue in the direct imputation studies is typically the
identification of an appropriately matched sample of before-and-after or
with-and-without observations relating to technology or program use.

Once

this has been accomplished and any remaining issues of selectivity bias have
been properly dealt with, productivity differences can be attributed to
program use and the benefits measured in relation to costs.

The classic study
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by Griliches (1957) demonstrated the basic methodology. 51

Griliches utilized

data on the first generation of hybrid corn varieties developed by both
private firms and public experiment station systems.
these varieties began to accrue around 1905.

The costs of developing

Experiment station and farm

level data enabled Griliches to estimate the yield advantage of hybrid corn
varieties over the older varieties in each state.

These data were used along

with adoption data to compute year-by-year benefit values, given by the change
in producer plus consumer surplus.

The resulting cost and benefit time series

were used to compute benefit-cost and rate of return measures.
The statistical studies employing meta variables have in some cases
estimated both the temporal and spatial spillover weights utilized in
constructing these variables.

Temporal weights estimated for agricultural

research programs indicate that TFP responses generally begin one or two years
following expendi.tures, rising to reach a peak after 7 to 10 years and then
declining as pests and diseases begin increasingly to erode the value of the
technology.
impacts.

Agricultural extension programs have faster and shorter-lived

Studies for industry usually do not attempt to estimate temporal

weights; rather, weights (typically non-increasing with time) are simply
assumed.
Spillover weights are designed to capture the value contributed by
research programs outside of the region.

Often they are combined with

technological distance measures of the kind discussed in section 5.

Earlier

studies used climatic indicators as simple proxies for technological distance.
Industrial studies typically specify that a firm benefits from R&D undertaken
by other firms in the same industry.

Griliches (1991) provides a review of

studies that have examined spillover effects.
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The estimated coefficients on the meta variables in these studies are
used to compute the economic impacts from an increment in investment.

The

marginal benefits from the increments have temporal and spatial dimensions
which are taken into account in deriving benefit-cost and rate of return
measures.

In turn, some studies provide parameter estimates which can be used

in computable general equilibrium models to examine the distributional

7.1.1

Returns to R&D
Table 4 summarizes results of 156 studies estimating returns to

agricultural research programs and 40 studies of industrial R&D.

Most of the

agricultural studies surveyed utilized secondary data (district-level data by
year in India, for instance) and were to some degree based on cross-section
variation in the meta variables.

Cross-section variability in research and

extension inputs has been quite important in permitting the identification of
their impacts; vexy few studies based on simple time series have been able to
identify their impact.

The TFP determining variables include measures of

research, extension, schooling, roads, markets, prices, and related variables.
In principle, the included variables should encompass the full range of TFP
enhancing activities, but not all studies have succeeded in this respect.
Several of the studies estimated the separate contributions of
pre-technology scientific research and of downstream applied research.
Several also estimated the contributions to agricultural TFP growth of private
sector R&D by firms supplying inputs to the agricultural sector.

This

contribution constitutes a pecuniary spillover from industry to agriculture,
one which occurs because supplying firms capture only part of the return to
their R&D through higher prices for improved inputs.

Of the 292 reported

rates of return to public agricultural research summarized in Table 4, 139
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Table 4
Estimated Rates of Return to R&D

Range of Estimates
Number
of
Studies

Estimate
Not
Sim!ificant

Mean
1-24

25-49

50-75

75+

3
22
45

3
13
23
40

1
13
25
44

56
80

Public Sector
Agricultural Research
Africa
Latin America

10
36
35
85

5

2
14
7
23

71

5

21

54

26

29

48

Private Sector
Industrial Research

5

0

0

3

3

2

58

Developing Countries

35

0

10

20

10

5

44

Public Sector
Agricultural Extension

17

1

4

2

4

6

50

Developing Countries

6

0

1

0

3

2

63

Asia

All Developing
Countries

1
2
2

20

All Developing
Countries*

41

46

Developed Countries

Developed Countries

•

Includes International Agricultural Research Centers.

Note:

Rates of return are in percent.

Source: Evenson (1993b).
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were above 50 percent; only 11 fell below 10 percent.

The distribution of

estimated returns shows higher estimated rates for programs in developing
countries compared to those in developed countries.

The few studies reporting

rates of return to private sector R&D used in agriculture also showed high
returns.
Fifty three of the 156 studies gave estimates pertaining to entire
agricultural research systems rather than to individual commodity research
programs.

The distribution of estimated rates of return in these studies did

not differ from that for studies focused on specific commodities.

The

similarity between the distributions of system-wide and commodity-specific
programs suggests that the latter studies do not suffer from a serious
selectivity bias; that is, that they have not focused only on the best
programs.

Nonetheless, as in other types of studies, it remains possible that

there has been some failure to report estimates that are not deemed "high
enough" to report.
One way to test the likely validity of the estimates is to examine the
growth of output or productivity that is implied by the rates of return when
considered in relation to the amounts invested.
have made the relevant calculation.

Unfortunately, few studies

One that did is the study by Rosegrant et

al (1993), which provides a full accounting for Indian TFP growth in
agriculture over the 1956-88 period.

Public sector research and extension

were found to account for approximately 60 percent of TFP growth.

R&D in the

private sector, domestic plus foreign spillovers, accounts for 30 percent,
with infrastructural improvement accounting for the remainder.
A number of observers have been puzzled by the result that
agricultural research programs in LDCs appear to be generally as productive as
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similar programs in developed countries.

They argue that LDC programs suffer

from lower skill levels and poor organization cum management, implying that
the comparative deficiencies should lead to lower returns.
arguments are pertinent.

Two counter

If a country is underinvesting in these activities,

marginal and average rates of return may be relatively high.

Thus, an appeal

to diminishing returns can explain why a low quality system subject to
under-investment could have a marginal impact as large or even larger than a
higher quality system with less under-investment.
Alternatively, large returns to LDC research may reflect their receipt
of greater spillovers from developed country research than can be realized
among developed countries.

Indeed, LDC systems, in concentrating on adaptive

invention, do rely on the international agricultural research centers (IARCs)
and developed country systems for pioneering invention and pre-technology
science.

At least in principle, this ought to e,'.lable the;n to generate equal

returns with lower skill levels.

Moreover, it does in fact appear that most

IARCs are enabling significant spillovers to LDCs.

Several of the studies

reviewed by Evenson (1993b) found high rates of return to the IARCs' research
programs.

For example, one of these studies [da Cruz and Evenson (1989)]

examined the role of a program for the Southern Cone countries in Latin
America that has made particularly concerted efforts in facilitating
international exchanges of technology and found high returns to this activity.
Another, recent study of genetic resources in rice [Gollin and Evenson (1991)]
reported high returns to the International Rice Research Institute's (IRR!)
international system to maintain genetic material.

In turn, the Rosegrant et

al (1993) study, discussed above, found substantial spillovers from foreign
private as well as public sector R&D.
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7.1.2.

Returns to Extension
Investment in agricultural extension has been seen as an attractive

policy option in LDCs for several reasons.

Among the valid reasons is the

fact that the real costs of extension services in LDCs are comparatively low
relative to the costs of research activities.

LDCs spend only one fifteenth

as much per extension worker as is spent in the advanced countries; in
agricultural R&D, they spend half as much per researcher.

Less valid is the

often encountered twofold presumption that technology invented in the advanced
countries is immediately transferable to developing countries and that
extension services play the major role in transfer.
Experience in Asia and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s ran
counter to both notions.

Large investments in extension and rural development

programs had relatively small impacts in many countries.

T.W. Schultz (1965),

in his classic monograph on traditional agriculture, argued from this and
other, micro evidence that traditional peasants were "poor but efficient,"
having exhausted the potential of the best suited technology.

He, of course,

noted the importance of education and skills, but he argued that in a setting
where little new technology was being made available to farmers, even the
least skilled farmers would learn to do the best that could be done given the
available technology.

Thus it was generally accepted in the 1970s that the

gap between the average and the best productivity levels was much smaller than
earlier thought, so that extension could be productive only after local
research programs generated new, circumstantially tailored technology.

This

perception was greatly reinforced by the development of the high yielding rice
and wheat varieties that came to be associated with the green revolution.
was easy to identify the associated productivity gains with the widespread

It
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adaptation of these varieties to different local circumstances, which only
strengthened the view that extension programs were of secondary importance and
could not generate significant results.
Perceptions have changed somewhat in recent years.

A new approach to

extension, the Training and Visit (T&V) system, was developed in World Bank
projects in the late 1970s [see Benor and Baxter (1984)].

This system imposes

a formal structure linking extension workers to technical specialists and
entails a fixed schedule of extension worker visits to farmers and farm
groups.

In its initial applications, the T&V approach proved successful in

overcoming the frequently criticized absence of sufficient extension worker
skills and disciplined management in previous approaches.

Thus it has been

introduced into a large number of Bank funded programs and has, in fact,
become the principal program in the Bank's lending for agriculture in Africa,
which has generally not yet benefited from invention of new technolo 6y.

In

some cases the introduction of the T&V system in Sub-Saharan Africa has led to
a reduction in extension and related personnel, but in the majority of cases
expenditures on extension are higher than under previous systems.
Some of the early studies to investigate the return to extension
relied on variables measuring extension worker contact with farmers as
indicators of extension provision.

Since extension contact is at least partly

determined by farmers' behavior, such variables are endogenous and positive
correlations between them and farm productivity can not be used to claim the
existence of a causal link between extension and productivity.

Later studies

have overcome the problem of endogeneity by using extension supply variables.
Technological and price information is diffused to farmers through a broad
range of channels, with farmer-to-farmer communication being especially
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important.
Birkhauser et al (1991) reviewed 40 studies of returns to agricultural
extension programs.

Few of the early studies showed significant returns.

But, of the more recent studies, 15 of the 26 that provide estimates of rates
of return report values in excess of 50 percent (see Table 4).

These include

two recent studies [Bindlish and Evenson (1993) and Bindlish et al (1993)] of
T&V extension in Kenya and Burkino Faso, suggesting that countries in Africa
still have considerable scope for reducing inefficiency even when new
technology is not being made available to farmers.
7.2.

Returns to Industrial R&D
Surveys of returns to private R&D in developed countries show that

investments in R&D, when evaluated ex post, yield private returns that are at
least as high as returns to other investments [Mohnen (1990)].

Mansfield et

al (1977a) report on 17 case studies of innovation for which the median
private rate of return was 25 percent.

Griliches (1980) reports rates of

returns for large U.S. industrial firms ranging from 30 to 50 percent.
Mairesse and Sassenou (1991), on reviewing a number of studies giving
statistical estimates of the impact of research expenditure on firm-level
productivity covering several advanced countries (France, Japan, and the
U.S.), found that all implied positive and highly significant elasticities,
with approximate rates of return ranging from 14 to 24 percent.

They found

corroborating evidence in another set of firm-level studies that gave direct
estimates of rates of return, leading them to conclude that, for the countries
covered, private rates of return to R&D were no less than those for other
forms of investment.

Significantly, in the case of Japan, the estimates, and

thus the conclusion, relate to the 1960s when it was largely engaged in
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adaptive R&D using imported technology as germplasm.
Social rates of return should exceed the private rates owing to the
individual firm's inability to appropriate, or capture, the full benefits from
conducting R&D.

Even in the presence of strong IPR protection, a private

firm's rents from licensing or product sales generally represents only a
fraction of the real value of the invention to the economy; that is, of the
invention's social return.

Indeed, according to the previously cited study by

Mansfield et al (1977a), social rates of return (median, 56 percent) were in
most cases more than double the private rates.

Griliches (1991) has reviewed

a number of empirical studies to estimate spillovers from R&D and concludes
that spillovers are of considerable importance, which is consistent with the
evidence that social returns are considerably in excess of private returns.
Very few studies have estimated returns to industrial R&D in LDCs.
The study by Basant and Fikkert (1993) is seemingly unique in providing
soundly based econometric estimates derived from firm-level data covering a
wide range of manufacturing activities.

As was discussed in section 6.4,

their estimates of the private returns to R&D in India are no less than
comparable estimates obtained for developed countries.
evidence that social returns exceed private returns.

They also find
Two studies of

industrial R&D in industries supplying agriculture have reported high rates of
return as measured by the impact on agricultural productivity [see Rosegrant
et al (1993)].

Pack (1987, 1990) computed potential returns from productivity

enhancing expenditures that would both accomplish adaptive modifications and
elevate levels of mastery over disembodied aspects in a sample of Philippine
textile firms.

He concluded that more than 80 percent of the firms in the

industry would realize higher returns from such expenditures than from
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alternative investments.
Pack's estimates pertain to investments designed to reduce the

dispersion of TFP levels across firms within the industry by moving the
inefficient firms closer to the best practice frontier.

To understand their

full significance, they must be considered in relation to the fact that all
studies of firm-level productivity differences within LDC industries find high
variance in TFP levels across firms. 52

Most LDC firms are well behind the

local production frontier and even further behind the frontier of
international best practice.

Given this evidence, Pack's estimates suggest

that there is tremendous potential for realizing high returns from investments
that would enable the achievement best practice.
It is exceedingly difficult to measure directly the overall volume of
technological effort related to technological change in the industrial
sector. 53

Generally, one can at most infer the results of such activity from

estimates of productivity growth.

It appears that very few LDCs have

experienced discernible TFP growth in industry over the past three decades
[Pack (Chapter 9 in Volume 1 this Handbook)].

Korea and Taiwan are notable

exceptions, where recent research indicates that TFP in the industrial sector
has grown at an average annual rate of roughly five percent, considerably more
than can reasonably be attributed to sources external to the technological
efforts of individual firms, and sufficient to have contributed a sizeable
share of the growth of real value added. 54
A comparative historical study of the textile industry in India and
Japan by Otsuka et al (1988) gives strong evidence about the gains that can be
derived from investments in mastery acquisition and adaptive change.

During

the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japanese firms invested much while
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Indian firms invested little.

The consequence was that Japan displaced India

in world markets and became a leading exporter of textiles.

The authors trace

the source of the difference in performance to Japanese policies which both
removed price distortions and encouraged technology transfer and adaptive
investment.
Indirect evidence also suggests that there are high returns to
technological investments.

Consider:

given what is known about the high

volume of technological effort in Korea and Taiwan, one can only conclude from
the apparent absence of significant TFP growth in most other countries that
they have either failed to invest sufficient amounts in technological change
or that their technological investments have been seriously misdirected.
Inward looking trade policies and restrictions placed on international flows
of technology are undeniably important sources of misdirection, as discussed
in elsewhere in this chapter.
Very few LDCs have managed to establish coherent and aggressive
technological development strategies for the industrial sector, comparable to
those that have been implemented in most countries for the agricultural
sector.

The evidence about the returns to technological efforts of various

kinds, while limited, does not suggest that the reason is a lack of high
payoff investment opportunities.

It is more likely that there has simply been

a failure to recognize that such opportunities do exist and to provide
incentives and support for them.
7.3.

Distributional Impacts
A number of studies have attempted in different ways to evaluate the

consequences of technological change for income distribution.

Many authors

have followed Kuznets in examining the relationship between income growth and
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income distribution.

Their work can be regarded as indirectly concerned with

the distributional impact of technological change insofar as technological
change is what produced the underlying productivity changes.

This literature

will not be reviewed here, except to note its general conclusion that the
distributional consequences of productivity growth are largely determined by a
host of non-technological factors. 55

Two kinds of study are especially

germane to this survey -- studies employing computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models and studies of micro-empirical evidence.
Careful attention to product mix and regional disaggregation is
important in the specification of CGE models to evaluate distributional
consequences in agriculture.

Product disaggregation is required to capture

the fact that a research induced change in the production function for a
single product has an effect on the supply functions for all products
competing for the same resources as well as on the demand functions for
variable factors.

Indeed, the availability of improved rice and wheat

varieties had a major impact reducing the supply of other cereals and pulses,
something generally overlooked in the literature appraising the green
revolution [Evenson (1992)].

Also too frequently neglected is the impact of

the circumstantial sensitivity of the new technology, which makes it suitable
for adoption only in regions having the requisite circumstances (for example,
the possibility of controlled irrigation).

Many micro studies, conducted for

regions where the new technology was adopted, have concluded that employment
and incomes were increased by its adoption.

However, they have failed to

recognize that there were negative distributional impacts in regions that were
unable to adopt it.
A principal result from nearly all CGE and micro studies is that the
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major gainers from new agricultural technology are the consumers of
agricultural products.

For urban consumers, improved agricultural technology

leading to lower prices is an unmitigated blessing no matter where or how the
gains are realized.

Farmers and rural workers also gain as consumers, but may

lose as workers and owners of rural assets.

The central parameter of concern

in this regard is the demand elasticity for the product. 56

With inelastic

demand, total farm revenues and demands for variable inputs fall.

This can

result in a decline in the incomes of small farmers and rural workers.
Subsistence farmers tend to be insulated from such changes because they
consume most of what they produce [Barker and Herdt (1985)].

In an open

economy facing a highly elastic world demand for the product, total farm
revenues increase and farmers as well as workers gain.
Many of the micro studies were motivated by a concern that advances in
agricultural technology harmed the poorest rural families, small farmers and
landless peasants.

There appears to be a consensus that this is generally not

true and that losses, where there they have occurred, have accrued to
landowners in areas that were circumstantially unsuited to adopt the new
varieties.

Barker and Herdt (1985) review studies for rice showing that small

rice farmers adopt new technology about as rapidly as do larger farmers and
thus share in the gains to early adopters.

In turn, a recent study for rice

at IRR! examined wage differentials within seven countries across regions
which are differently endowed with respect to the ability to adopt the new
varieties and found that they have been largely eroded by labor mobility.
Instead of wage differentials, land rent differentials have emerged [David and
Otsuka (1990)].
Thus the empirical evidence, at least for agriculture, is consistent
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with the basic analytical implications of general equilibrium theory.
Improved technology enables more production from given resources.

Various

equilibrating mechanisms, labor mobility being one of them, insure that any
losses ultimately accrue to fixed factors that are disadvantageously located
relative to the technological change.
We are unaware of any studies that have systematically addressed
distributional issues in relation to industrial technological change in LDCs.
The studies of Becker et al (1992) for urbanization in India do show impacts
on regional employment and migration, but generalizations are difficult to
make.

Virtually all improved technology, when implemented, changes the demand

for factors in spatially specific ways.

With sufficient mobility, both

locationally and occupationally, gains become widely dispersed.

Ranis (1990)

found that such mobility has been an important factor in maintaining, and
indeed imp:roving, T,aiwan' s relatively equitable income distribution.

High

degrees of mobility are also found in other countries; what evidence there is
suggests that it has generally insured favorable distributional outcomes over
time from technological change.
8.

Policy Issues

Technology policy is made by public bodies at the international,
national, and regional levels.

Private enterprises and individuals also make

policy, largely by responding to incentive systems established by public
policy makers.

This section discusses policy options for international and

multilateral agencies as well as for national (and, to some degree,
sub-national) governments.
8.1.

International Policies
Until recently, IPRs were administered on an international level
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the Paris Convention for

through international "conventions" or agreements

patents, the Berne Convention for copyrights, and so on.

As noted previously

and discussed in a number of studies, the mechanism for administration and
enforcement of IPRs has recently shifted to trade law.

The United States has

pursued this shift most vigorously by treating weak or absent enforcement of
IPRs in LDCs as forms of "unfair" trade practice, subject to sanctions under
Section 301 of U.S. trade law.

With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of

the GATT, a new and powerful enforcement mechanism is in place to facilitate
the harmonization of IPR laws and their administration throughout the world.
This development has two important implications for LDCs.

First, it

ostensibly provides a mechanism under which they might seek compensation for
opening their markets to foreign technology.

Such compensation can be in the

form of trade concessions, but these will be granted only if the governments
seeking them are eff,~ctively .able to negotiate them.

The second and more

immediate implication is that most LDCs no longer have the option of seeking
to pirate technology under systems of weak IPR protection to foreigners.
These changes will affect different countries in different ways.

For

level la and lb countries (see Table 1), the stress will be on developing
effective IPR systems were they do not now exist.

Emphasis in the level le

countries will be placed on building more effective IPR systems.

Level 2

countries are likely to find that defiance and laggard efforts on full
harmonization of IPR systems will be very costly in terms of restricted market
access and technology withholding.

An important issue in IPR policy for all

national governments is that they not let policy be determined or dominated by
the interests of the developed countries who have pressed for the new GATT
agreement.

As discussed below, it is crucially important that domestic
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inventions be given adequate incentives in national IPR policies.
There is considerable evidence of the effectiveness of international
research and information centers a$ well as training efforts directed toward
the agricultural sectors (and possibly also the health sector).

The

international agricultural research centers have clearly served to facilitate
international exchange of technology and parental germplasm.

Their

effectiveness has been dependent on national agricultural research centers,
extension services, and farmer schooling.

There is little doubt that these

programs in support of agricultural technological development warrant
continued support.
Far fewer resources have been directed toward similar programs for the
industrial sector.

Past initiatives to establish organizations that would

roughly parallel those for agriculture have been stifled.

This may in part be

due to the unwillingness of private firms to share knowledge and technology
openly.

Trade secrecy is much more a part of industry than of agriculture.

But, even adjusting for this, we do not observe the same effectiveness in
programs of research and information exchange for industry as for agriculture.
But there is sufficient promise in this domain to warrant further experiments
seeking more effective international programs in support of technological
development in industry.

The same conclusion would appear to hold for the

service sector as well.
8.2.

National Policies
The policies of national governments are constrained by international

policies.

But the constraints do not hinder the formulation of appropriate

national policies that would be sufficient to achieve rapid technological
development in tandem with meaningful economic progress.

Indeed,
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international policies, even in the realm of IPRs, are actually supportive of
and complementary to adequate national policies.
The public sector has two roles to play in technological
development. 57

One is to provide an appropriate policy environment for

private-sector investments in technology.

Policies that directly affect

private sector technological development include regulations on trade in
technology (for example, on technology purchase agreements) and in goods that
significantly embody technology (capital goods, for instance) as well as
tariffs on the latter.

They also include subsidies and taxes that affect

technological efforts of various kinds along with domestic IPRs.

The public

sector's other role is to be the investor in areas where the private sector
can not effectively operate.

Public investments include expenditures on R&D

and technology dissemination as well as support for training and related
activities.

There are important policy J.ssues wit:h respect to both roles as

well as in relation to the proper boundary between them.

In the following,

boundary issues will be dealt with where most appropriate in the course of a
discussion that focuses first on promotional policies and then on public
investments.
8.2.1.

Trade Policy
Protectionist policies to foster import substitution have historically

been the principal tool for attempting to stimulate private-sector
technological development.

The fundamental rationale for protection is found

in the tacitness of technology, which implies that internationally competitive
levels of productivity can not be reached without experience-based learning
which entails comparatively high costs that must in some way be financed.
But, as is well recognized, tacitness per se is not a sufficient grounds for
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granting protection, since an efficient capital market would provide the
financing to cover any losses from warranted learning.

In this respect the

first best policy is to promote the development of an efficient capital
market.

In fact, financial institutions in most LDCs appear to lack effective

capability in relation to financing technological investments of all kinds.
Thus the importance of capital market development for technological
development can not be denied, but there are no quick fixes in this realm just
as there are none in the technological realm.

The gains from improvements in

the financial sector will be largest for countries at higher levels of
technological development; capital market development alone will achieve
little in the level la and lb countries owing to their lack of basic
production capabilities.
Externalities that preclude the complete appropriation of returns to
technological investments provide the most general and comp~lling rationale
for promoting technological development [Pack and Westphal (1986)].

This has

long been recognized with respect to related investments in labor training.
But the recognition that externalities pervade the process of technological
development has been slow in coming.

Externalities related to the

nonrivalrous nature of technology have their source not in its tacitness but
rather in its circumstantial sensitivity and in the tacitness of local
circumstances.

Additional sources of externalities are found in the

increasing returns that characterize many forms of technological investment
and in the savings in transactions costs that result from technological
development. 58

Some of the externalities are real or "technological"

[Scitovsky (1954)]; many are Marshallian externalities -- pecuniary insofar as
they are transmitted through market transactions; others take the form of
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spillovers, including demonstration effects.
None of the foregoing forms of externality constitute a sufficient
grounds for protectionist policies.

Apart from considerations of strategic

trade policy -- which, if relevant, would apply only to the most advanced LDCs
(level 2c), protection is never the first-best policy on theoretical grounds;
subsidies to technological investment are first-best, as is well known.

Thus

the only case that can be made for protection is one based on pragmatic
grounds [see, for example, Pack and Westphal (1986)].

That said, the evidence

overwhelmingly indicates that protectionist policies have not fostered
successful technological development except, perhaps, in those few countries
where they have been coupled with additional policies that effectively insure
the rapid achievement of internationally competitive levels of capability, so
that protection is indeed a temporary "necessity."

The only policies so far

known to possibly qualify in the latter respect are those that make the rapid
growth of exports profitable.

Export activity also has the additional benefit

of greatly facilitating spillovers from foreign entities. 59
The foregoing discussion applies equally to all forms of protectionist
policy including those aimed at various kinds of technology import.

Temporary

protection against technology imports, through such means as restrictive
licensing of purchases of capital goods and disembodied technology or domestic
content regulations for project engineering, might appear -- on pragmatic
grounds -- to offer a strong means for encouraging technological development.
However, such policies can more easily have the effect of severely retarding
technological development by blocking access to critical elements of foreign
technology.

Like all protectionist policies, but even more so, their

potential effectiveness depends entirely on whether they are administered with
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adequate enforcement mechanisms to insure that they are indeed promoting
meaningful technological development. 60
Consider that both India and Korea have used similar, albeit
differently administered, protectionist policies to restrict technology
imports.

There can be no doubt that, coupled with an inward-looking policy

regime, they had disastrous consequences in India. 61
well have been generally effective.

But in Korea they may

The most apparent and undoubtedly

consequential difference between the Indian and the Korean implementation of
the policies was one of timing.

They were seriously applied in Korea only at

a relatively late stage of technological development, after the achievement of
high levels in a wide range of production capabilities and in some investment
capabilities.

The Indian strategy was more nearly one of attempting to

acquire the full range of capabilities through efforts, that were initially
centered in the capital goods industries, to reinvent technology.

Among other

effects, these efforts had the unintended consequence of locking producers in
many sectors into the use of outmoded technologies.

Another important

difference in the implementation of protectionist policies in these countries
may be found in the distinct structures of their bureaucracies.

The Indian

bureaucracy was seemingly incapable of accomplishing the high volume of
administrative processing that would have been required to enable rapid
growth.
8.2.2.

Domestic Policies
Given the factors that constrain public policy in all LDCs, the

pragmatic argument for protection is an ex post rationalization of its
possibly successful use, not an ex ante justification in its favor.

Other

kinds of incentive policies offer a more straightforward means of stimulating
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Direct subsidies and tax preferences have

technological investments.

theoretical justification but are of limited relevance insofar as some
important kinds of technological investment, particularly some of those
related to the achievement of mastery, are not readily separable activities.
Formal R&D activity, purchases of technology, and related labor training are
the only readily identifiable investments.

Many countries, particularly those

at level 2 where formal R&D becomes increasingly more relevant, provide
subsidies for R&D activity.

As with subsidies for other activities, they do

not always achieve the desired results, sometimes leading only to the
relabeling of activities anyway undertaken.

Nonetheless, they are a means to

achieve more R&D by producers.
The inherent difficulty of directly subsidizing many relevant forms of
technological investment would seem to imply that IPRs and indirect measures
must be the principal means, apart from institution building, of promoting
private-sector technological development.
below.

IPRs are discussed at some length

Among the indirect measures, most important are the assurance of a

stable macro environment, the enforcement of competitive market behavior, an
open-economy strategy with respect to trade of all forms. 62

No country has

achieved sustained technological development without continual attention to
these policy imperatives.

Of the other indirect measures that have been

discussed in the literature, four merit brief mention here.
One is the use of public enterprises to transfer and develop
technology.

More often than not, the pursuit of non-market objectives by

these enterprises retards rather than promotes technological development.
However, there are some notable exceptions, such as the USIMINAS steel firm in
Brazil [Dahlman (1979)].

A closely related measure is the selective promotion
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of certain industries on the grounds that they are the drivers of
technological development; the contemporary favorites include the familiar
"hightech" industries such as "informatics."

At some levels of technological

development there clearly are certain activities that merit priority; metal
working and simple machinery repair at levels la and lb, for example [see, for
example, Pack and Todaro (1969)).

But there are few such obvious cases, and

even with respect to them there is too often little attention paid to
performance monitoring and enforcement.
Also closely related in its apparent rationale to the promotion of
public enterprises is the promotion of large scale, conglomerate firms, such
as the chaebol in Korea.
telling.

Here the comparison between Korea and Taiwan is

Taiwan's industrial structure is as much dominated by small and

medium enterprises as is Korea's by super-large ones.

Yet the two countries

have comparable records of technological development.

This suggests, as does

other comparative evidence, that large firms have no inherent advantages in
relation to technological development [see, for example, Levy (1991) and Levy
and Kuo (1991)].

The final indirect measure is the promotion of direct

foreign investment.

It is indirect because of the need for complementary

measures to realize the full gains from the operations of foreign firms.

In

Singapore, for example, foreign investment promotion has been coupled with
extensive public support to technical education and training in order to
insure continued technological development through the attraction of a rapidly
changing mix of foreign firms.

Except in some industries, direct foreign

investment is neither a necessary nor an obviously superior means of
technology transfer.

But it may be the only effective means to initiate a

process of sustained technological development in the level la and some level
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lb countries.

Here its potency will depend on the use of complementa ry

policies to insure spillovers through labor mobility into local small and
medium enterprises .
8.3.

IPR Policy

Developing countries have an obvious incentive to pirate foreign
inventions unless there are effective penalties against doing so.

Penalties

are both overt in the form of sanctions imposed by foreign governments and
covert in the form of supplier reluctance to sell technology of any kind.

As

discussed previously, the imposition of sufficient penalties in the case of
the level 2 countries can now seemingly be considered a fact of life.

If

these countries do not recognize the IPRs of foreigners, they will suffer from
retaliation in their export markets and will be unable to obtain elements of
technology needed to fuel their technologic al development .

But the

recognition of foreign IPRs is only half of what is needed.

Strong domestic

IPRs are also needed to stimulate adaptive cum imitative invention, in part as
a legitimate counter to the recognition of foreign IPRs.

Existing and

prospective internation al arrangement s do not place any barriers to the
implementat ion of strong domestic IPRs.
Strong IPRs can be a powerful instrument for encouraging many forms of
investment at all levels of technologic al development if they are sufficientl y
focused on promoting those forms of investment which are respectivel y
important at each level.

More imagination than has previously been given to

their design is clearly in order.

Breeders rights and utility models

exemplify the gains to creativity in this area.

Utility model protection, for

example, is actively sought in the few countries, like Korea, that grant it.
Moreover, the evidence suggests that it stimulates the kinds of minor,
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adaptive inventions that are important in the early to middle phases of
technological development.
The development of improved IPR systems in the level la and lb
countries is, however, probably not feasible; other activities, particularly
the establishment of a legal infrastructure for property rights enforcement,
take precedence.

The level le countries need to evaluate their existing IPR

systems, which are in most cases colonial legacies, in order to develop
systems better suited to their own needs.

Given their level of technological

development, the use of IPRs to facilitate imports of technology through
formal means is an important consideration.

Level 2a and 2b countries

typically have weak IPR systems reflecting the previous dominance of
international concerns to the detriment of domestic interests.

They need to

recognize the importance of IPRs in stimulating domestic inventive effort and
refashion their IPR systems accordingly.
8.4.

Public Sector Investment
The issues relating to public sector investments in technological

development are neither easily summarized nor readily resolved.

Where there

is sufficient justification, such investments can yield high returns.

This is

evident from public sector investments in R&D and extension relating to
biological (agricultural and medical) technology.

Unfortunately, the

rationale for public sector investment is nowhere else so clear-cut. 63
rationale alone is not enough; adequate management is also required.

But
The

principal difficulty in managing public sector investment is insuring that it
meets the real needs of its clients.
agriculture.

A workable model for doing so exists in

The absence of comparable models for investments in other areas

imposes additional costs and uncertainties of undeniable significance.

From
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the scanty, largely anecdotal, evidence that is available, one has to conclude
that various forms of public sector investment in other areas have in some
places and at some times yielded high returns.

One can only guess at the

average returns on a global basis for any of the modes; the best guess is that
the returns have been quite low.

But more often than not it would appear that

the reasons for low returns have as much, if not more, to do with poor
management than with inadequate potential returns to the activity if properly
directed.
Of the more specific lessons that may be drawn from past experience,
those in two areas stand out.

The first relate to industrial R&D undertaken

by public sector research institutes.

R&D to reinvent technology simply does

not pay unless it is conducted to overcome absolute restrictions on supply, a
consideration that is relevant only to the level 2c countries attempting to
enter certain industries.

Otherwise, seemingly successful cases of

reinvention turn out on closer inspection to be instead well managed cases of
adaptive transfer; notable examples of this kind of research have been
undertaken by Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute.

In turn, the

obstacles to achieving high returns from adaptive public sector research on
technologies already well established in production are nearly insurmountable.
To be productive, industrial research must be conducted in close proximity to
experience gained in production.

Simply stated, the good ideas for

implementable adaptive invention come largely from production experience and
are not easily communicated beyond the plant perimeter.

Ways around the

obstacles to adaptive research can be found, but few institutes appear to have
discovered them.
The second area where important lessons have been learned relates more
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generally to the fact that the public sector's role as a direct investor is
too much taken for granted by those concerned about the promotion of
technological development.
industry.

Consider public sector extension services to serve

The most obvious point to be made here is that the returns to

promoting the development of private sector suppliers of technology may well
exceed those to investing in public sector extension.
private sector alternatives even recognized.

But seldom are such

In turn, diffusion of best

practice technology has in some countries been effectively performed by
industry associations acting on behalf of their private members.

As a rule,

too little attention is paid to stimulating such private institutional means
of providing what are essentially club goods.

These observations are not

intended to suggest that private sector solutions are necessarily best; in
truth they are often infeasible.

Rather, possible private sector solutions

merit attention b~cause such solutions can be expected to accelerate
technological development.
8.5.

Complementary Investments
Some final comments about investments in science and in human capital

formation are in order lest it be thought that inattention implies
unimportance.

Evidence of high returns indicates that investments in

pre-technology sciences are important for adaptive invention in areas where
technological distances are large.

In turn, comparative human capital data

strongly imply that the NICs could not have succeeded without investing
heavily in technical and scientific education through the college years and in
vocational training.

But in nearly all LDCs the problem has been on the

demand side, not on the supply side.

It makes no sense to invest more in

high-level technical human capital formation until sufficient progress is
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achieved in realizing technological development. 64
9.

Research Directions

There are many studies, both analytical and empirical, that are being
undertaken with some success at present.

On the analytic front, endogenous

growth and dynamic trade models are offering more to the field than much
earlier theory.
forthcoming.

Further contributions and insights will undoubtedly be

The specifications of imitation and spillover in models to date

are clearly not yet capturing the full richness of real world phenomena;
distinct levels of technological development need to be incorporated into this
work more clearly.

The same can be said with respect to important

distinctions among modes of technology transfer ranging from direct foreign
investment through informal apprenticeship.

Without capturing significant

differentiation s in these respects there is likely to be little progress in
adequately distinguishing b1~tween cases of success and failure in catchup
growth.
It goes almost without saying that theory, at least as regards
technology, unsupported by empirical work deservedly has a rather short life.
Also that more than simply stylized facts are needed.

Theorists must develop

testable propositions, and empiricists must devise ways to do the kind of
testing required to discriminate between alternative hypotheses.
to say that carefully conducted case studies are unimportant.

This is not

But in the

future case studies will need to be conducted with more attention to
analytical rigor and careful quantification of costs and benefits than has
been true in past; that is, they will have to do so if they are to contribute
useful results that go beyond suggestive interpretations .

Case studies of

seemingly successful public sector investment programs outside of agriculture
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are especially needed.
This survey makes clear that there are many significant gaps in the
body of pragmatic empirical studies as between developing and developed
countries.

There can be no question about the need for many more studies

estimating rates of return and examining relationships between domestic
investment and foreign technology in the industrial sector.

Here future

studies should be guided by the methods and specifications now being used in
state-of-the-a rt research on developed countries.

A methodology for

addressing issues concerning externalities and spillover is at hand and should
be widely applied.

Another important branch of pragmatic studies employs

direct questioning of managers to obtain insights regarding decisions and
decision making processes.

Such studies of foreign suppliers and domestic

purchasers of technology can add importantly to the understanding of
motivation and behavior.
Suggestions for a complete research agenda are not made here.

In

particular, studies of factor bias and distributional impact are not
considered.

This is not because such studies are without value, it is rather

because the first order of business in a large part of the developing world
must be the improvement of productivity through policy reform and investment
in technology.

Distributional problems can usually be dealt with (when they

occur) using policy instruments that do not affect the overall pace of
technological development.
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FOOTNOTES
1 ·The Schumpeteri
an (1934) definitions of "invention" and "innovation " are
used throughout this survey; the terms refer to the creation and
commercial ization, respectivel y, of new technology. Many authors in the field
use "innovation" to mean both things.
2 ·Their

effectivene ss in doing so is, however, constrained by the tacitness of
local circumstanc es.

3 ·A

prime example is the Indian Ambassador automobile. The original model
remained unchanged for 30 years, this in spite of global advances in engine
efficiency, braking systems, and the like.
4 ·The

arguments are built on micro foundations provided by previous research
on the generation of new technology and the formation of human capital which
demonstrate d that R&D and schooling are not conventiona l factors of
production, both being characteriz ed by important positive externaliti es. On
R&D, see Arrow (1962a), Mansfield, et al (1977b), Scherer (1986), Griliches
(1991); on schooling, Denison (1962), Becker (1964).
5 ·See

Lau (forthcomin g chapter of handbook) for further discussion of
endogenous growth models. Rodrik discusses endogenous growth theory in
relation to issues of policy reform.
6 ·We

review the limited empirical work regarding IPR impacts on R&D investment
in section 6.4.

7

·Patents apply to the first two kinds of invention; utility models, to the
third. More is said about these forms of IPRs in section 3.1.

8 ·Nelson

and Winter (1982) built an evolutionar y theory of what would now be
termed endogenous growth on the basis of a somewhat different search model.

9 ·As

will be seen in section 5.2, research results obtained elsewhere and
transferred in the form of germplasm are the dominant mode of biological
technology transfer in agriculture .

10 -Kortum (1992)
demonstrate s diminishing returns under more general
specificatio ns of the density function. Only "fat-tailed " Cauchy-type
distributio ns do not yield diminishing returns in this type of model. See
Nordhaus (1969) for application s.

11 ·Empirical evidence
of exhaustion in some fields is reported in Evenson and
Kislev (1975) and Evenson (1992).

12 ·The

dependence of one firm's adoption decision on prior decisions by other
firms has been variously interpreted in terms of information costs, risk
reduction, and competitive pressure.
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13 ·Plotted

against time, the estimated value of p(t) appears as a forward
falling S; the proportion of adopters first grows slowly, then rapidly, and
then again slowly.

14 ·See,

for example, Mansfield et al [(1977b), chs. 6 and 7].

15 ·0n

the roles of education and extension in agriculture, see Griliches
(1957), Birkhauser et al (1991), and Jamison et al (1991).

16 ·La.u

(forthcoming chapter of handbook) focuses on research falling within
this tradition.

17 ·Nelson

(1993) provides extensive descriptions of the technological
infrastructure that has been established in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Korea,
and Taiwan.

18 ·See

Siebeck et al (1990) for a review.

19 ·The

movement toward stronger IPRs in all developed countries is likely to
bring these changes to more countries.
20 ·The

evidence regarding IPRs as stimulants to invention is discussed in
section 6.4.

21 ·Nordhaus

2 2 -See

(1969) gives the standard treatment.

also Evenson (1990).

23 ·See

Timmer, Chapter 8 in Volume 1 of this Handbook, for additional
discussion.
24 ·Huffman

and Evenson (1993) provide extensive descriptions of archetypal
hierarchical structures.
25 ·Unlike

seeds for open pollinated crops, hybrid seeds can not be obtained
from the previous year's harvest. Instead, they must be produced continually
through a sequence of inbreeding and crossing. This creates a market for
improved seed varieties, since new seeds must be purchased from seed producers
annually.
26 ·Huffman

and Evenson (1993) also discuss the historical evolution of the
pre-technology sciences, observing that they were not developed until
invention oriented researchers at level III expressed a demand for more
science of a distinct kind to enhance their inventive activities.
27 ·"Manufacture"

here refers to the sector in which the patented input is
produced, which need not be -- but often is -- the same as the sector from
which the patent originated.
28 ·Tables

2 and 3, discussed in sections 4.3 and 5.4, respectively, show
applications to Indian and Korean data as well as to international data used
to determine a measure of technological distance.
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29 ·0ne

can also apply the concordance to data on R&D expenditures or
scientists and engineers engaged in R&D to get some idea, for example, of how
much R&D within the manufacturing sector is for the benefit of the
agricultural sector, or of how much R&D attention is given elsewhere to
sectors that perform little or no R&D.
30 ·This

is clearly demonstrated in Table 2, as is discussed in section 4.3.

31 ·The

term "spillovers" generally refers to benefits of any kind conveyed in
the form of externalities derived from invention. In this survey,
"spillovers" refer to benefits derived from the transmission of knowledge used
either directly or indirectly (as inventive germplasm) by other units.
32 ·Westphal

et al (1985), Fransman (1986), Lall (1990), and Enos (1991)
discuss the capability concept at some length. Westphal et al (1990) discuss
a systematic, quantitative application.
33 ·Cortes

and Bocock (1984) provide an illuminating description of alternative
modes, and of factors on both sides of the market that affect choices among
them, in the case of petrochemical technology.
34 ·In

a turnkey project, a local owner contracts with a foreign agent to
provide all the elements needed to design and establish a facility as well as
to initiate production. Among the elements is enough training to impart the
rudimentary mastery needed to operate a well maintained facility under assumed
conditions relating to such things as material input availability and
specifications.
35 ·As

discussed in section 5.3, transfers of new biological material from
international agricultural research programs substitute for absent fundamental
R&D capabilities and thereby complement local experimental and extension
capabilities.
36 ·Lall
(1990) provides data for a more comprehensive set of indicators
relating to technological development in the manufacturing sector for level 2
countries. The range of possible indicators is quite extensive, as may be
seen from those given in National Science Board (1991) and OECD (1993).
Similar compilations are available for several of the more advanced developing
countries.

37 ·India,

which has long had an atypically extensive system of public
industrial R&D institutes, is a level 2b country.

38 ·An

empirical measure of technological distance is discussed in section 5.3.

39 ·Implicit

throughout this survey is the belief that there is no general
justification for LDCs to go beyond inventive adaptation in undertaking R&D.
Some authors, Stewart (1977) for example, have argued -- using the induced
innovation hypothesis -- that there is ample justification, on the grounds
that invention in the advanced countries is increasingly irrelevant to the
developing countries owing to growing divergence between them in key
circumstantial factors.
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40 -Note

that DJ 1 need not equal D1J owing to the impact of differences in
circumstances between locations i and j.
41 ·These

values relate to average yields in location i for the three crop
varieties that have the highest yields in location j relative to the three
varieties that have the highest yields in location i. To obtain the distance
measure, the not unreasonable assumption was made that unit costs vary in
direct but inverse proportion to yields.
42 ·For

analysis and evidence indicating that this is not so even in the
developed countries, see Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
43 ·However,

owing to changes in macroeconomic policy, they suffered a serious
loss of market share in the 1980s.

44 ·Measurement

at lower levels of aggregation would show considerable
variation among technologies within sectors. Evenson (1993c), for example,
has found that the use of imported patents among advanced countries is
proportionately much greater in the manufacture of agricultural chemicals than
in the production of harvesting machinery, which reflects the relative
variability of soil characteristics .
45 ·Cohen

and Levin (1989), in their survey of the evidence from developed
countries, make many general observations that are of relevance in the LDC
context as well.
46 ·A

high level of mastery is not sufficient by itself to insure an efficient
outcome. See, for example, Desai (1972) for a case study illustrating some of
the many things that can go wrong in a complex industrial undertaking over
which local control is lacking due to financial exigencies.
47 ·See,

(1991).

for example, Blomstrom and Persson (1983) or Haddad and Harrison

48 ·Specific

rates of return are not given here because estimates for India, as
for developed countries, are highly sensitive to the specification employed.

49 ·For

example, through machinery imports.

50 -Except

in certain chemicals-relat ed areas, it is generally rather easy to
devise a functional substitute for a successful new product that does not
actually infringe the original inventor's patent.
51 ·Some

of the results from this study are discussed in section 5.2.

52 ·Pack

(Chapter 9 in Volume 1 of this Handbook) surveys these studies.

53 ·Mikkelson

(1984) demonstrates one approach to the problem.
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54 ·The recent studies
are summari zed in World Bank (1993, ch. 6). Notable
studies for Taiwan and Korea include Pack (1992) and Pilat (1993),
respect ively. Lau (forthco ming chapter of handbook ) gives an alterna tive view
regardin g TFP gains.
55 ·General

literatu re surveys are given by Taylor and Arida as well as by
Adelman and Robinson in Chapters 6 (Volume 1) and 19 (Volume 2), respecti vely,
of this Handboo k.
56 ·Among

the relevan t CGE models are those construc ted for the Philippi nes by
Quisumb ing et al (1993) and for India by Quizon et al (1991).
57 ·See

Ergas (1987) for a general discussi on of technolo gy policy.

58 ·Stewart

and Ghani (1991) provide a detailed discussi on of the forms of many
relevan t externa lities.
59 ·Pack

(1992, 1993) explores externa lities that may be associa ted with export
activity . The linkage between export-l ed industr ializati on and rapid TFP
growth is examined in a CGE modeling framewo rk in de Melo and Robinso n (1992).
60 -stewar t's

forcefu lly.

(1979) survey of technolo gy licensin g policies makes this point

61 ·Lall

(1987) provides a detailed discussi on of Indian performa nce in
technolo gical developm ent.

62 ·0n the
importan ce of indirec t policies more general ly, see Sagasti (1978)
and Stewart (1987).
63 ·Justman

and Teubal (1986, 1991) demonst rate the elements of a rigorous
justific ation for public investm ent in technolo gical infrastr ucture to benefit
the industr ial sector.
64 ·Enos

(1991) provides a compreh ensive discussi on of the relation ship between
technolo gical developm ent and human capital formatio n.
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